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Rin Kaiho evens the series by winning the 4th game of the 6th Kisei title match. Rin came very close to dethroning Fujisawa Shuko. Watching are Hashimoto Shoji and Takagawa Shukaku.

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The cover: A long-nosed *tengu* and an *asparas* or heavenly maiden in an al fresco go game high above the madding crowd. From a painting by Kyosai (1831 – 89) reproduced in C. Netto and G. Wagener: *Japanischer Humor*, Leipzig, 1901.

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Go World News

Hashimoto Shoji Takes Oza Title from Kato

After his setback against Otake in the Judan title match, Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in had better luck with his second title challenge of the year. In the 29th Oza title match Hashimoto defeated Kato 2-1 to win his second Oza title. His previous win was twenty-two years ago. This is the Kansai Ki-in's first title since Hashimoto won the Judan title in 1974. The results:

Game 1 (27 Oct.). Hashimoto (W) won by resig-

nation.

Game 2 (9 Nov.). Kato (W) won by 3½ points.

Game 3 (7 Dec.). Hashimoto (W) won by resig.

Kato Defends Tengen Title

Right at the end of 1981 Kato redeemed what was for him a very disappointing tournament year by just barely managing to hang on to his Tengen title. The 7th Tengen title match went the full distance — the first time in the short history of this new tournament — but Kato pulled out all the stops in the final game to defeat the challenger, his fellow Kitani disciple Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan, 3-2. Kato has now won this title for four years

in a row. The results:

Game 1 (25 Nov.). Kato (B) won by 3½ points.

Game 2 (3 Dec.). Kobayashi (B) won by resig.

Game 3 (10 Dec.). Kato (B) won by resig.

Game 4 (21 Dec.). Kobayashi (B) won by 2½ points.

Game 5 (28 Dec.). Kato (W) won by 5½ points.

Three New 9-dans

Three players won promotion to 9-dan in the 1981 autumn session of the Nihon Ki-in oteai. They are Hane Yasumasa, Tozawa Akinobu and Sakai Takeshi. There are now 39 9-dans at the Nihon Ki-in and another 22 at the Kansai Ki-in. Incidentally, Sakai is the director who has been in charge of organizing the reform of the oteai. This reform has run into opposition and does not seem likely to be put into effect in the near future.

Fujisawa Shuko Defends Kisei Title Yet Again

Fujisawa Shuko has completed his toughest, most nerve-wracking defence of the Kisei title. Shuko did not appear to be in very good condition during the 6th Kisei title match and he was very lucky to defeat the challenger, Rin Kaiho, 4-3.



Hashimoto Shoji wins the 29th Oza title

37th Honinbo League (as of 12th March, 1982)

Rank	Name	T	R	K	S	H.U.	I	H.S.	K	Score
1	Takemiya	—	1	1	0	0		1		3 — 2
2	Rin	0	—			1	0	0		1 — 3
3	Kato	0		—	1		0	0	0	1 — 4
4	Sakata	1		0	—		1		0	2 — 2
5	Hashimoto U.	1	0			—	1	0	0	2 — 3
5	Iwata		1	1	0	0	—		0	2 — 3
5	Hashimoto S.	0	1	1		1		—	0	3 — 2
5	Kobayashi			1	1	1	1	1	—	5 — 0

Note: the players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

Rin held the initiative for most of the title match and after successive wins in the fourth and fifth games he had two chances to become Kisei. He seemed to have the title within his grasp when he set up a favourable position in the sixth game, but he slipped up in the endgame. Rin also had a good position in the seventh game, but once again Shuko managed to stage an upset. This was his luckiest Kisei title defence.

Below are the full results of the Third Stage and the title match (results in the first two stages are given in GW25, pages 3 and 4).

Third Stage. Prelim. round: Kobayashi beat Ishigure, Rin b. Shiraishi.

Quarter-finals: Kobayashi Koichi b. Cho Chikun, Takemiya b. Kato, Awaji b. Otake, Rin b. Hasegawa.

Semifinals: Kobayashi b. Takemiya, Rin b. Awaji.
Final. Game 1 (12 Nov.). Rin b. Kobayashi by resig.; *Game 2* (19 Nov.). Rin b. Kobayashi by 4½ points.

6th Kisei Title Match

Game 1 (13, 14 Jan.). Rin (B) won by resig.
Game 2 (27, 28 Jan.). Fujisawa (B) won by resig.
Game 3 (3, 4 Feb.). Fujisawa (W) won by 3½ points.
Game 4 (17, 18 Feb.). Rin (W) won by 7½ points.
Game 5 (24, 25 Feb.). Rin won by resig.
Game 6 (10, 11 Mar.). Fujisawa (B) won by 3½ points.
Game 7 (17, 18 Mar.). Fujisawa (W) won by resig.

Honinbo & Meijin Leagues

Kobayashi Koichi is making up for his double failure at the end of 1981 (in the Tengen title

7th Meijin League (as of 12th March, 1983)

Rank	Name	K	O	R	T	K	Sa	Sh	Ho	Ha	Score
1	Kato	—	1				0				1 — 1
2	Otake	0	—			1			1		2 — 1
3	Rin			—			1		1	1	3 — 0
4	Takemiya				—		1	0	1	0	2 — 2
5	Kobayashi		0			—				1	1 — 1
6	Sakata	1		0	0		—	1			2 — 2
7	Shimamura				1		0	—	0	0	1 — 3
7	Honda		0	0	0			1	—		1 — 3
7	Hane			0	1	0		1		—	2 — 2

Note: the players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

match and the Kisei playoff) with his splendid form in the Honinbo league. With five straight wins, he only needs one more win to become the challenger to Cho Honinbo. A puzzling feature this year is the terrible form of Kato, who seems almost certain to drop out of the league.

Kato is doing little better in the Meijin league. There the early leader is Rin Kaiho, who is followed closely by Otake and Kobayashi.

Cho Challenges Otake Judan

Cho Chikun, holder of the Meijin and Honinbo titles, is making his first challenge for the Judan title. After two games, the 10th Judan title match is tied one each. Otake won the first game played on 3 March, by resignation, but Cho came back in the second game, played on 11 March, to win by 2½ points.

TV Haya-go

Three TV tournaments have been decided recently. Kobayashi Koichi won the 14th Haya-go Championship, defeating Yamabe Toshiro 9-dan in the final 2-1. Sakata Eio won the 29th NHK Cup, overcoming Sugiuchi Masao in the final (played on 22 February). This was the eleventh time that Sakata has won the NHK Cup and it took his tally of titles to sixty-three. The 4th Kakusei tournament was won by Cho Chikun.

4th World Amateur Go Championship

The Chinese again starred at the World Amateur Go Championship, held at the Nihon Ki-in in Tokyo from 16-20 March this year. The star of the tournament was the nineteen year old Chinese player Tsao Ta-yuan, who defeated his compatriot Yang Chin-hua in an all-Chinese final (the third in four tournaments). The top Japanese amateur, Hirata Hironori, had to be content with 3rd place. Thanks to the reduced number of entrants from the Orient, Western players were able to take six of the top twelve places. They should do even better next year, when each country will only have one entrant.

Prizewinners are listed below.

- 1st: Tsao Ta-yuan (China)
- 2nd: Yang Chin-hua (China)
- 3rd: Hirata Hironori (Japan)
- 4th: Kim Chul-joong (Korea)
- 5th: Fernando Aguilar (Argentina)
- 6th: Sidney Kobashigawa (U.S.A.)
- 7th: Lutz Mattner (West Germany)
- 8th: Ray Tomes (New Zealand)

- 9th: Na Jong-hoon (Korea)
- 10th: Kanno Masaaki (Japan)
- 11th: Ernst Novak (Austria)
- 12th: Rob van Zeijst (Holland)

During the course of the tournament, a meeting was held to inaugurate the International Go Federation. We will give more details of the Federation, together with a fuller account of the Championship, in a later issue.

1981 Team Championship of Yugoslavia

The fifth team championship was held in Subotica on 28-30 November, with thirteen five-member teams taking part in the two divisions. The winner of the 'A' division was the team 'Student' from Nis, which scored 23 points out of a possible 25. Second place was taken by the Belgrade Go Club team and third by Go Club 'Kranj'.

China Institutes Professional System

At a press conference held in Tokyo during the 4th WAGC, the Chinese team captain, Wu Sung-sheng, announced that the Chinese had set up a system of professional go players as the first step towards founding a Chinese Ki-in. Initially, ten professionals were created, with ranks awarded on the basis of results in the Chinese Championship, but this number will soon be increased.

To begin with, there are three 9-dans: Nieh Wei-p'ing, Ch'en Tsu-te and Wu himself. These are followed by two 8-dans, three 7-dans, one 6-dan (who is Nieh's wife, K'ung Shang-ming) and one 5-dan. The first rating tournament for professionals was slated to begin in late March, with about one hundred additional players participating.

The above ten professionals will be paid a salary (said to be about equivalent to that of a university lecturer in China) instead of earning their living from prizemoney.

Late News

Cho Takes Lead in Judan Title

Cho Chikun won the third game of the Judan title match, played on 25 March. Otake, playing white, resigned after 153 moves. Cho now has two chances to take the title.

Takemiya Wins NEC Cup

Takemiya Masaki defeated Otake Hideo in the final of the 1st NEC Cup, another TV haya-go tournament.

A new departure in go publishing

THE KISEIDO PUBLISHING COMPANY

announces the publication of

INVINCIBLE

THE GAMES OF SHUSAKU

Compiled, edited and translated by John Power

A definitive collection of the best games of one of the greatest go players in history, with detailed commentaries by top modern professional players and a full description of the historical background.

Shusaku (1829 – 62), 'the invincible', was the outstanding player in an age of go geniuses. In the annual castle games (O-shiro-go), participation in which was severely restricted to the top players of the day, thus making it the highest honour open to a go player, Shusaku set an unprecedented record of nineteen straight wins over a period of thirteen years, a feat without parallel in the two hundred and fifty year history of the castle games. He was also victorious in every important match he played and, in what was the golden age of go, he firmly established his preeminence. His tragic death at the age of thirty-three was an enormous blow to the go world.

Shusaku also made great contributions to the development of go theory. His famous 'Shusaku style' fuseki pattern laid the foundations of modern fuseki theory and is still popular today. In Japan his games are considered exemplary and are required study for all serious students of go. In fact, the first task invariably assigned to would-be professionals or insei is to go through his complete games. Go Seigen is one example of a famous player who studied Shusaku thoroughly in his formative period.

This book gives a unique and detailed insight into the world of nineteenth century Japanese go. Apart from the castle games mentioned above, highlights include:

Shusaku's precocious triumph over Gennan Inseki, the arch-enemy of the Honinbo house. Their series produced the most famous move in go history, 'the ear-reddening move of Shusaku'.

All the games from the famous twenty-three game series in which Shusaku finally defeated his main rival, Ota Yuzo.

Shusaku's games with his teacher, Shuwa, the 14th Honinbo, which contain some of the most interesting and subtle go of the period.

And many others, amounting to eighty games with detailed commentary (Part One), with an additional selection of sixty-two games (Part Two).

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36th Honinbo Title

After losing three straight to the challenger, Takemiya Honinbo made a fine recovery in the fourth game, playing his best go of the series and surviving the kadoban. However, the scales were still weighted heavily against him. The question was no longer whether or not he could defend his title, but for how long his delaying action could keep Cho from becoming the fourth and youngest Meijin-Honinbo of modern tournament go.

Game Five

White: Cho Chikun, Meijin

Black: Takemiya Masaki, Honinbo

Komi: 5½; time: 9 hours each

Played 8, 9 July 1981 at Hakone Gora.

Commentary by Murakami Akira




Figure 1 (1 - 54)


Figure 1 (1 - 54). An unsound moyo strategy

White 4 is designed to prevent Black from playing sanren-sei. If Black 'a' next, White 'b' would counteract the influence of the sanren-sei.


White 6. The continuation to 16 was played very quickly, so both players must have been satisfied with it.

White 18 serves a dual role as a kakari and as a ladder-block. If Black plays 19 at 20, White will play the joseki in Dia. 1. After 2 to 7, Black would not be able to get a ladder with 'a'. That makes this joseki favourable for White, which is why Black ignores 18 to play 19. White continues at 20 — each player is going his own way.


Black 27 and 29 are an attempt to build up a large moyo, but this strategy is unreasonable. Why? Because pushing down at 30 is perfect for White. Ishida Yoshio 9-dan suggested that instead



Dia. 1




Dia. 2



Dia. 3

11: connects



Dia. 4

of 27 Black should either secure the bottom left corner with 41 or play at 32, the latter being the junction point of the black and white moyos.

Black 33 is aggressive. Black 35 instead would be more peaceful, but that would let White flatten out Black's moyo by pushing down at 33. When Black plays 33, he realises that he cannot avoid suffering some damage in the corner.

White 38. If at 1 in Dia. 2, Black can save his corner stones with 2 and 4. White can capture two stones with 7, but Black will be satisfied with the hane at 8.

Black 39. If Black connects at 1 in Dia. 3, White captures everything with 2 to 12.

White 40. This result is favourable for White. Black's mistake in strategy with 27 is to blame.

Black 43. If at 'c', White would probably invade at 'd'.

Black 45, 47. Takemiya-style.

White 52, the sealed move, seems to be an overplay. It would be much simpler to let Black live in the corner with 2 and 4 in Dia. 4. White could next switch to the bottom left sector and should be able to retain his lead. White 52 gives Black a chance to get back into the game.





Figure 2 (55 - 100)



Dia. 5

Figure 2 (55 - 100). White's lead become shaky.

The moves from Black 55 on are a standard sequence for settling a group. On this occasion the solid diagonal connection at 63 is a good move, securing Black's base at the top. Black has gone a long way towards recovering from his bad start.

White attacks with 64 etc. to settle the shape. Black could live immediately by playing 69 at 81, but that would be too docile.

White 74. If White simply answered at 1 in Dia. 5, he might lose sente, for Black could switch elsewhere after 2 and 4. If White attacked his eye-shape with 'a', Black could use the atari at 'b' to link up to the centre.

White finally forces Black to accept gote with 81, but he puts his sente to questionable use with 82 and 84. At the time Cho thought that these moves gave him enough territory, especially considering his follow-up at 86, but after the game he commented that he should have played more positively. Instead of 84, he should have invaded at 89 (even 'a' would be good enough). Black would have no chance of killing the invader.

White 86, which threatens the cut with White

'b'—Black 'c'—White 'd', is a good invasion, but Black has a surprisingly effective counter with 87 etc. He probably gets more territory here than White bargained for. White still has his lead, but the game is now very close.






Figure 3 (101 - 135)



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Figure 3 (101 - 135). White slips up.


Black 1. An all-or-nothing move which shows admirable fighting spirit. Cho must have been surprised by this invasion coming after he had finished walling off the side with 100 in Figure 2. However, he made the strongest counter with 2 and 4.

Black 5. Black could also play 1 etc. in Dia. 6. After the moves to 8, Black has a good hane at 9, setting up an approach-move ko. Apparently, however, Black does not have enough threats to fight this ko.

White 6 is the only move: White secures life in the corner while taking away Black's eye-shape.

White 8. If at 1 in Dia. 7, White collapses after Black 2 to 6.

White 14 is a mistake: Black's position would be almost hopeless if White played 1 in Dia. 8. The



Dia. 8

best that Black could do would be to play 2 and 4, then aim at cutting at 'a' after White 5, but even if he managed to set up a semeai (capturing race) he would not have enough liberties to win it. Cho apparently felt that following Dia. 8 would be dangerous, but the drawback of White 14 is that Black is left with the option of playing Black 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c' after White 16. That is quite a gain for Black and means that his do-or-die move at 1 has been a success (even though the invading stones die).

White 18 is another mistake: White should answer Black 17 at either 19 or 21. White 18 gives Black a troublesome peep at 19.

Black 35 is a good move: if White cuts at 'd', Black counters with 'e'.

Figure 4 (136 – 183). *Cho's blunder*

Black 37. Black slips up after his good move at 35 in the previous figure. He should first exchange the atari of 1 in Dia. 9 for White 2 before playing 3. White would then play 4, after which Black 5 and 7 would be just right.

White 38 decreases the value of 5 and 7 in Dia. 9 by making Black thin in the centre.

Black 39 is too small: Black 5 and 7 in Dia. 9 are still big even after White 38. Black suffers a setback in the centre when White reinforces with 48 and 50. Not that White's play here is beyond reproach either: he should play at 50 immediately, omitting 48. In that case, if Black played 'a' next, White would be happy to play 'b', but if Black did nothing, White would have a good continuation at 'a', aiming next at 'c'.

White 60 is a blunder which made Cho very





Figure 4 (136 – 183)

58: connects; 73: ko




Dia. 9

angry with himself. Cho expected Black to defend at 'd', after which he planned to connect at 64, but under the pressure of byo-yomi he overlooked Black's diagonal connection at 61. When Takemiya started the ko with 67, the game was decided, for Cho did not have enough ko threats. Instead of 60, White had to connect at 1 in Dia. 10.

Dia. 10. Takagi 9-dan hypothesized the continuation to 22 after White 1 and concluded that this gave Black a lead of $\frac{1}{2}$ to $1\frac{1}{2}$ points. Ishida Yoshio agreed that playing this way would have retained a very slight lead for Black.

White 74. The best ko threat that White has, but it is not enough.

Black 77 is sente, making White 'e' necessary, but White plays 78 to set the scene for resignation.



Dia. 10

Even though he cuts with 80, Black easily links up with 81.

White resigns after Black 183.

(‘Igo Club’, September 1981)

Game Six

White: Takemiya Masaki

Black: Cho Chikun

Date: 15, 16 July 1981. Played at Atami.

Commentary by Cho Chikun





Figure 1 (1 – 44)


Figure 1 (1 – 44). A new taisha variation

White 10 seems to have been a little unimaginative; it lets Black build influence with 11 and 13, making his continuation at 15 perfect. White should have followed Dia. 1 with 10.


Black 15. The joseki continuation at the top is



Dia. 1



Dia. 3




Dia. 2

1 to 5 in Dia. 2, but that would let White play 6, leading to a leisurely game. Black’s aim with 15 is to start a total war. Cho: ‘My personal preference for 15 would be the pincer at 1 in Dia. 3; that would probably lead to a game of fragmented fighting, but just for this game I thought that I would narrow the focus and try a linear approach.’


White 16. White could avoid the fight by playing 1 in Dia. 4, but having to crawl the extra space on the third line would be painful. Another peaceful option would be White 1 at 2, Black ‘a’, White ‘b’, Black ‘c’, White ‘d’, but Takemiya is known as a stylist and he would probably consider White’s shape unbearable.

White 30 is Takemiya’s invention. If White followed the joseki with 1 in Dia. 5, his three stones would come under severe pressure after Black 2.

Black 31, 33. Cho: ‘These forcing moves were



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

crude, but my strategy was to concentrate on the fight on the right side.'

Figure 2 (45 – 100).

Black 45 to 49 build thickness and preempt White 'a'.

White 50 looks natural, but the later course of the game shows that it is dubious. White should attach at 1 in Dia. 6. If Black 2, White 3; next 'a' and 'b' are miai for White. It is true that Black is left with 'c', so the difference is not so great, but —

Black 53 demonstrates that White has made a mistake in the order of moves. Black 51 and 53 represent a gain for Black over Dia. 6. Even so, Cho commented that making a two-space extension to 58 on the left side was more urgent than 53. If White played 1 and 3 in Dia. 7 (assuming







Figure 2 (45 – 100)




Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

2: elsewhere

first White 54 to Black 57), Black could be satisfied with blocking at 4 in the corner.

White 60. The move which Takemiya regretted most in this game: the honte (proper move) is defending the top at 'b'. The point of 60 is to enable White to tenuki if Black hanes at 77, that is, at 1 in Dia. 8.

Dia. 8. White can safely ignore Black 1. If Black attacks with 3 etc., White wins the semeai with the sagari at 12. Instead of 5 —

Dia. 9. If Black connects at 5, then cuts at 7, White plays 8, letting Black capture five stones in gote. The good aji White gets by capturing a stone with 10 is sufficient compensation.

Either Dia. 8 or 9 would be reasonable for White, but the problem is that Black is too subtle to come rushing in here. Instead, he keeps all this aji in reserve, waiting for the right time to take advantage of it.


White 74. White would desperately like to extend to 83 on the left side, but an invasion by Black at 'a' would be too severe. That is why White 60 was wrong. Black 75 is a superb pincer.

Black 75. The sealed move.


Black 87. A bad slip by Cho — he should have followed Dia. 10 instead.

Dia. 10. Descending at 1 is the best move. After White lives with 2 to 8, Black can continue with 9 to 13. This would be a good result for him.


The reason why Cho blocked at 87 was that he expected White to play 92 at 1 in Dia. 11. That




Dia. 10



Dia. 11



Dia. 12



Dia. 13

would let him play 2 in sente, and blocking at 'a' would also have been sente. However, his plans were upset when White made the hane at 92.

Black 93. If at 1 in Dia. 12, White could switch to 2. Not even the capture with 3 and 5 would get sente for Black. However, 93 is a puzzling move, since this cut has no obvious meaning. The explanation is that at first Cho did not intend to block at 97, so he made the cut just to give himself some aji in the corner. The more he thought about it, however, the bigger 97 came to seem to him, so he changed his mind and blocked anyway. Actually all his analysis was off the mark, since Takemiya commented after the game that he would have answered Black 1 at 3 in Dia. 12. The end result, what with Cho's misreading concerning Dia. 11, was that Takemiya gained some profit in this corner.

Note that in the top right corner Black could play 1 etc. in Dia. 13. Black 5 is a good move which sets up a ko, but since Black also has a lot at stake, this diagram is not a realistic option.

Figure 3 (101 – 150). *Takemiya's missed opportunity*

White 8 clears up the bad aji at the top. Cho regretted missing the opportunity to play Dia. 8 just for its yose value.

White 20. Better than cutting at 26.

White 28. Apparently the losing move, though neither player realized how important it was at the time. Instead White should have played at 1 in Dia. 14.

Dia. 14. White reduces the centre in sente with 1 and 3, then turns at 5. If next Black 'a', White can connect at 'b'; if Black omits 'a', his side territory suffers with White 'a', Black 'c', White 'd'. Cho admitted that Black would probably have lost if White had played this way.

Black 31, 33. These moves decide the game; the result is quite a contrast to Dia. 14.

Figure 4 (151 – 221). *Meijin Honinbo*

The moves in this figure do not affect the out-





Figure 3 (101 – 150)



Dia. 14




Figure 4 (151 – 221) 67: connects

come: the game was decided by the play in the centre in the previous figure, but Takemiya played it out to the bitter end. Although he had salvaged some of his pride with his successive wins in the fourth and fifth games, he was unable to hinder Cho's triumphal progress any further.

With the acquisition of the Honinbo title, Cho became the fourth and the youngest Meijin

Honinbo of modern tournament go (following Sakata in 1963 – 64, Rin in 1968 and Ishida in 1974). It will be interesting to see how long he can hold on to his place at the top.

Black wins by 3½ points.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes

Black: 8 hours 53 minutes

('Kido', September 1981)

6th Gosei Title

Gosei Title Winners

- 1st (1976): Kato (defeated Otake 3–2)
- 2nd (1977): Kato (defeated Takemiya 3–0)
- 3rd (1978): Otake (defeated Kato 3–1)
- 4th (1979): Cho Chikun (defeated Otake 3–0)
- 5th (1980): Otake (defeated Cho 3–1)
- 6th (1981): Otake (defeated Kato 3–1)

As the chart of title winners shows, Otake and Kato have dominated the Gosei title, taking nine of the twelve 1st and 2nd placings in the title to date. Before this match the two had met twice in the title match and the honours were even. Also, both Otake and Kato were in a relative slump during 1981, so each was probably more than usually determined to take this title. In particular, the Gosei title has special significance for Kato, for the 1976 title was his first title ever (it was preceded by second places or unsuccessful challenges in eight other tournaments).

Game One

White: Otake Hideo, Gosei & Judan

Black: Kato Masao, Tengen & Oza

8 July 1981; played in Kanazawa

Figure 1 (1 – 35)

White 20. White is able to counterattack because Black did not play 1 in Dia. 1.

Dia. 1. Black usually makes the forcing move at 1 before making the pincer at 3. If then White 4, Black 5 is a good follow-up. This seems preferable to Black's strategy in the figure. After White 20, the continuation to 34 is more or less forced, but the result seems slightly favourable for White. After the game Kato commented that he should have followed Dia. 1.





Figure 1 (1 – 35)



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Figure 2 (36 – 80)

White 50 and 52 secure the corner territory but at the cost of letting Black take the initiative with 53. White should play 50 at 53, even though




Figure 2 (36 - 80)




Figure 4 (121 - 164)




Figure 3 (81 - 120)

Black might then invade the corner.

White 76 is a big point, but jumping to 77 would also be a good move. Black 77 works well with Black's thickness at the top and the bottom.

Figure 3 (81 - 120)

White 86. A careless move, much regretted by Otake. The exchange for 87 gains White nothing and hurts his own eye-space. White should simply defend at 1 in Dia. 2; if next Black 2 etc., the continuation to 7 would settle the white group more effectively than the sequence in the figure.

White 102. Once Black has built thickness at the top with 93 and in the centre with 97 to 101, White has to do something to defend against the

placement at 'a'. However, Black goes into the lead when he completes a large centre territory with 103 and 105.

White 110. Played to prevent Black from playing 'b'—White 'c'—Black 110 in sente, but defending at 'd' seems bigger.

Figure 4 (121 - 164)

Black 49. Cutting at 50 would make Black thicker.

Black 61. A blunder which throws the game




Figure 6 (165 - 238)

84: connects ko (at 75); 107: ko (above 104); 110: ko (at 104); White wins and connects the ko.

away for Black. He would be able to keep safely in the lead if he played Black 'a', White 63, Black 'b', White 'c' instead. The game is lost once White pushes in at 64.

Figure 5 (165 – 238) (page 13)

Black 69. If Black answered White 68 by cutting at 72, he would have no answer to a hane by White at 80. Rather than give up his stones on the edge, he sets up a ko with 69 to 79.

Black 77. Actually Black could live with 77 at 'a', but White would get sente to reduce the centre with White 89, Black 'b', White 'c'. The ko is a desperation measure, but it fails when White simply connects at 84 – Black 85 is not sufficient compensation.

White wins by 6½ points.

Game Two

White: Kato Masao

Black: Otake Hideo


16 July 1981; played in Hiroshima

Figure 1 (1 – 50)


Black 1 – 9. This is one of Otake's favourite patterns. It has become so popular with other professionals that he comments he'll have to think up a new one.

Black 27. Black aims at settling his group immediately. An alternative is to build central influence by attaching on top of 26.


White 46, 48. The 1–3 combination in Dia. 1 seems preferable. Black 51 in Figure 2 is a severe kosumi which prevents White from getting eye-



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

shape.

Black 49 defends against the threat of White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'.

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Black 53. Black should omit this move, playing at 55 immediately. The 53–54 exchange makes it possible for White to counter 55 with 56 – see




Figure 1 (1 – 50)






Figure 2 (51 – 100)



Dias. 2 and 3.

Dia. 2. If simply Black 1, White must connect at 2. Black 3 is a good continuation of the attack. Instead of 2 —

Dia. 3. If White resists with 2, Black plays 3 (as a ladder-block), then attaches at 5. If next 6, White has no answer to Black 7; if White 6 at 'a', Black forces with 'b', then plays 'c', setting up cuts at 6 and 7.

White 66. If omitted, Black threatens to attack with the sequence in Dia. 4.

White 72. Linking up his groups by playing at 'a' would make White thick.

White 74. White should first play 1 etc. in Dia. 5. He would keep sente, so he could switch to 7 after Black 6.

White 76 has to be at 79. Kato must have completely overlooked Black's attack with 77. This uncharacteristic lacuna in his analysis is an indication that he was out of form. It was only after Black played 79 that he realised that he could make the placement at 81 next. The enormous dent made in White's side territory up to 88 decided the game.

White 84. If at 'b', Black might play a ko with 'c', White 'd', Black 88.

Figure 3 (101 – 163)

White 58. White 60 is correct, but White is looking for a place to resign.

White resigns after Black 163.

Game Three

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Kato Masao

28 July 1981; played in Kochi City

Commentary by Kudo Norio 9-dan




Figure 3 (101 – 163)

ko (at 8): 18, 21; 23: connects (at 8)

After his two incredible blunders in the first and second games, his fans must have been getting worried about Kato's poor form. Already he was faced with a kadoban (a game which could lose a series), but he recovered to play his best go of the title match. Kudo Norio, who was the referee for this game, comments that it was the most interesting one of the series.

Figure 1 (1 – 34)

Black 15. Black could also cut at 1 in Dia. 1 (next page). The continuation to 6 is the current joseki. The old joseki was Black 5 at 'a', followed by White 'b', but this exchange is now considered






Figure 1 (1 - 34)



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


bad for Black.

White 16. If White blocks at 1 in Dia. 2, Black cuts at 2. The continuation to 12 is probable. This result is close to equal, but just a little unappealing for White.

The result to 33 — a division of profit and influence — is probably a new pattern. The game is even.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

at 'a' or hanes to the right of 'a', White pulls back at 1.

Black 57. Black would like to cut at 1 in Dia. 4, but this would be premature. White counters with the warikomi of 4, then plays at 8, making good use of the stone above (56 in the figure). The fight after 9 to 14 is clearly unreasonable for Black, but if he had made the Black 'a' — White 'b' — Black 'c' — White 'd' exchange first, White would not be able to cut at 12. That is why Black plays 57 and 59 in the figure and why White answers 63 peacefully at 64.

Black 69. An excellent point — Black's cut at 61 has been a success, though he has paid a sacrifice in the bottom left corner. The game is proceeding satisfactorily for Black.




Figure 2 (35 - 76)

Figure 2 (35 - 76)


White 38 is an excellent point. Kato commented that perhaps he should have played 35 at 58.

White 40. A good forcing move — imagine the difference if Black pushed up at 40. White threatens to invade at 'a' or 'b', so Black defends at 41.


White 42, 44. A diversionary attack: White's real aim is to expand his moyo with 46 and 48. The usual move here would be White 42 at 53.

Black 49. Black is afraid that pushing up to the right of 48, making the game a moyo contest, might not give him enough territory to win.

White 56. An interesting strategy — if Black answers by cutting at 1 in Dia. 3, White gets a good result with 2 to 8. If Black simply plays 1



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Black 73. Black could also play at 1 in Dia. 5. The continuation to 7 could be expected, but this would leave White with a large move at 'a', so Black's strategy in the figure seems superior.

White 74. If at 1 in Dia. 6, Black cuts at 2





Figure 3 (77 - 131)

96: connects; 115: ko (above 110); 127: ko (at 119)



Dia. 7

12: connects

and wins the semeai.

Figure 3 (77 - 131)


Black 77. Kato missed a chance to clinch the game here. Playing 77 to 81 is meaningless, since White has an effective counter at 82. Instead of 77—

Dia. 7. Blocking at 1 is the strongest move. Black's only worry is White's counterattack at 2, but this is not a threat. If White 4, then Black 5 and 7; even if White makes an eye with 14, the worst that can happen is a seki, which of course would be a great success for Black.

Dia. 8. White might fill a liberty with 4 here, but Black is still safe after 5 to 9.

Dia. 9. If White switches to the corner with 2 and 4, Black seals him in with 7 and again is satisfied.

Following one of the above three diagrams would have put Black ten points ahead on the board, but in the sequence to 100 in the figure White takes a small lead. Black's violent attack with 101 is an attempt to upset that lead.



Dia. 8






Figure 4 (132 - 197)



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

White 106. Now it is Otake's turn to go wrong. White 106 just gives Black the chance to play a ko. White should follow Dia. 10.

White 116 is the actual losing move, for it and 118 do not give White sufficient compensation for losing the ko. Instead of 116, White should play at 'a'; if Black answered at 'b', he would lose the ko, so White would be able to save his captured stones with 'c' next. This way White would still have had a chance of winning.

White 122. Another ko starts, but White cannot win this one either. Black 125 is a good ko threat: if White continues the ko fight with 128 at 'a' as a ko threat, Black will jump out at 'd'. White is in a no-win position.

Figure 4 (132 - 197)

Black could put the white group at the top into ko, but he does not need to. White plays 70 to set the scene for resignation. After Black 97, the corner group is safe — even if White plays 'a', Black forces with 'b', then hanes at 'c'.

White resigns after Black 197.

Game Four

Black: Otake Hideo

White: Kato Masao

Komi: 5½; played August 3 at the Nihon Ki-in

Commentary by Otake




Figure 1 (1 - 30)

Figure 1 (1 - 30)

Opening moves on the 3-4 points have been much in evidence recently, so for the sake of variety I played Black 1 and 3 on the star points.

White 12 at 'a', followed by Black 'b', White 16, Black 'c', gives the large avalanche joseki, but the slower-paced move at 12 is frequently played too.

I hesitated over Black 15. Black 'd' on the lower side was also a big point.

It was hard to find the right place for Black 17. White's reply at 18 was obvious, so Black 17 had the drawback of chasing White from behind.

Instead of Black 19, I should have played directly at 23, aiming at a capping attack at 22. Playing 23 after White jumped out to 22 left Black with an over-solid position.

The joseki from White 24 to 28 gave a relaxed game with White in quite a good position.

Black 29 was too defensive. I should have reinforced the right side indirectly by capping White at 'e', a move which feels good from Black's standpoint and which White would have difficulty in answering. Instead it was White who got to make an ideal capping attack at 30.





Figure 2 (31 - 44)

Figure 2 (31 - 44)

After answering Black 31 by jumping out to 32, White had the lead. He had better shape on the left side than Black had on the right, and the black group in the upper left was still weak enough to be a source of worry.

Black 33 was not good. I was concerned about White 'a', but the correct move here was to invade the bottom left corner at 44. When White blocked at 34, I had no choice but to hane at 35, but I was in a bad way. So far Kato had completely outplayed me, beating me to the lower side with 24 and taking immediate advantage of my failures to cap him at 32 and to invade at 44.

But his next move was doubtful, as Kato himself agreed. Rather than play White 36, he should have blocked at 1 in Dia. 1, then descended at 3. If Black approaches the corner at 4, White can make the diagonal contact play at 5, and the continuation through 12 is likely. Since instead of this White cut at 38, I was able to recover by establishing myself on the left side in the sequence through 44. Black's prospects in the game suddenly brightened considerably.



Dia. 1





Figure 3 (45 - 84)

Figure 3 (45 - 84)


Giving atari at Black 45 could easily have lost me the game. I should have made a diagonal contact play at 50. Black 50 would threaten tesujis at 'a' and 'b' and White would be hard put to find a reply.

White 46 skilfully forced Black into a shortage of liberties that had ominous implications for the black top left group. I could have defended more safely by playing 49 at 52, but Black 52 would have no effect on White. That was why I chose the aggressive move at 49, but it led to trouble later. Kobayashi 9-dan, who was watching the TV monitor in the next room, apparently commented that Black 52 would have been more reasonable, and he was right.

White 52 caught me just where I feared. Kato had spent forty-five minutes around the noon recess thinking about White 50, during which time he was probably reading out 52. In reply, I had to compromise with 53. Black 1 in Dia. 2 would let White take a large profit with 2 through 10, and Black would still be left



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

without well-defined eye-shape.

But then White turned away with 56, giving me a much-welcomed chance to block at 57. I would have found a clamp at White 1 in Dia. 3 rather disagreeable. Black cannot descend at 2, because White just captures this stone by cutting at 3 and 5 and connecting at 7. Black must therefore play 2 at 7, followed by White 2, Black 5, and then probably White 'a'. That sequence would earn White a good profit.

Kato commented that he should have played 60 at 'c'. That was undoubtedly a possible move.


After becoming strong on the left side, I was able to invade at Black 61. I now felt that I was in the lead.

I thought of jumping to 'd' with Black 67, and I guess I could have gotten away with that. I was worried that White would turn in at 69, but I could probably have coped with White 69 by jumping again to 'e'.

Black 71 made miai of connecting to the group above and blocking at 73, and actually blocking at 73 brought the black invading force out of danger.

In reply to White's diagonal attachment at 76, Black 77 was an overplay. To defend the area on the right side, the descent at 1 in Dia. 4 was the safe move. If White invaded the top right corner at 2, Black could block at 3, and answer White 4 with Black 5 without suffering much damage.

The trouble with Black 77 and 79 was that they left an invasion point for White at 82. With the descent



Dia. 4

at 1 in Dia. 4, this invasion would not have been a serious threat.

Black 81 could not be helped. In fact, even after it Black seems susceptible to attack. One move was just not adequate to defend this area.

I was expecting the invasion at 82. Thanks to White 84, however, I was able to escape without risk. White 84 was the losing move.





Figure 4 (85 - 113)


Figure 4 (85 - 113)

After blocking at 85, it was a simple matter to link up with 87 to 91. I had been worried that White would push at 1, then attach at 3 in Dia. 5. If Black cuts at 4, White cuts in return at 5, leading to the sequence through 9. This line of play is clearly too dangerous for Black. An alternative is to hane at 4 in Dia. 6 and jump to 6, but then White pushes in at 7, forcing Black 8 through 12, and after White 13 Black is in trouble once more.


Since neither Dia. 5 nor Dia. 6 works well, Black's best course is probably to answer White 1 and 3 by playing 4 through 12 in Dia. 7. This is worse than the result through Black 91 in the figure, but it may be the best Black can do.




Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8


Kato must have misread White 84 in the last figure. He criticized this move himself later. After linking up with Black 91, I became fairly hopeful of winning.

White 94 was an annoying reverse sente move. I should have been quicker to hane at 'a'.

Kato made a last stab at pulling the game out with White 98. Properly, I should have answered by blocking from the inside with 1 in Dia. 8, then descending at 3. That would have been thicker, and White's group as a whole would have been left with worries about eye-shape. Those worries disappeared when White cut with 104 and captured a stone with 108. However, Black captured two stones with 109, so the result was not unsatisfactory. Perhaps it was a fair result for both sides.

With Black 111, if I had hane at 'b' and connected, I would have had definite eye-shape.

Black 113 in response to White 112 could not be helped. If Black carelessly blocks at 1 in Dia. 9, White cuts at 2. Black has to answer at 3, whereupon White can wedge in at 4. If Black now plays 'a', White 'b' is a double atari, while if Black plays 'c', White 'd' captures a stone.



Dia. 9




Figure 5 (114 – 200)

79: connects

Figure 5 (114 – 200)

A diagonal move at 50 would have been better than Black 19, and Black 27 was also too complacent. Black 31 may have been another mistake. In the endgame I made a large number of feeble moves and White was able to close the gap quite a bit. Still, around the time of the diagonal contact play at Black 49 I began to see my way clear to victory.

Although this did not affect the outcome, White could have gained one more point by peeping at 'a' with 74, followed by Black 'b' and White 75. For this reason, Black 67 should have been played at 75.

White could have started a ko by cutting with 82 at 83, but to no purpose, since Black had more ko threats. White 82 was therefore correct.




Figure 6 (201 – 264)

ko: 52, 55, 58, 61, 64. White wins the ko.

Figure 6 (201 – 264)

Although this ended as a close game, with Black winning by only $2\frac{1}{2}$ points, that does not indicate that it was particularly well-played. White actually had more chances than Black. I expected to be attacked more strongly on the left side, and I should have been in trouble when White invaded on the right. Kato was off his form; that was the only thing that saved me.


Kato's comments: 'The cut at White 38 in Figure 2 was a mistake, and instead of White 84 I should have played 1 and 3 in Dia. 5. I have many regrets about this year's Gosei series.'

Black wins by $2\frac{1}{2}$ points.


('Kido', October 1981. Translated by James Davies)

Tesuji Problems


The following problems range in difficulty from the elementary kyu level to dan level and include some basic shapes which every player should be familiar with, as well as some classic problems.




1. Black to play (7 to 10-kyu)
What is the tesuji for connection?




2. Black to play (4 to 6-kyu)
What is the vital point for winning the semeai in the corner?




3. Black to play (1 to 3-kyu)
White's shape has a surprising weak point. Can you find it?




4. Black to play (dan level)
Can you capture the corner white group?




5. Black to play (7 to 10-kyu)
What is the correct answer to White's atari at 1?




6. Black to play (4 to 6-kyu)
Black wants to move into the centre, but there is a good and a bad way to do it.



7. Black to play (1 to 3-kyu)
Black has an endgame tesuji in the corner that makes good use of his captured stone.



8. Black to play (dan level)
Black only has one eye. Is it possible to get a second?



9. Black to play (dan level)
The four black stones seem to be trapped, but it is too soon to give up hope.

Answers are given on page 31.

Redmond v. Sakata

As promised in our previous issue, here is Michael Redmond's game with Sakata, played in the summer of 1981. Michael has continued to do well and on 18 November he won promotion to 2-dan, with a 7-2 record in the oteai. He was one of the first players in the new group of shodans to win promotion. Unfortunately, he has already been eliminated in the 1-dan championship in the Kisei tournament, though he won his first two games.

White: Sakata Eio 9-dan

2 stones: Michael Redmond, then 1-dan

25 August 1981; played at the Nihon Ki-in's summer go seminar at Kinugawa Spa. Time: 20 minutes each, plus 30 seconds byo-yomi.

Commentary by Cho Chikun Meijin

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Black 20 is a calm, solid move. Black could capture two stones by cutting at 1 in Dia. 1, but White would build central thickness with the sequence to 14.




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Black 22 is another good move: White cannot push through at 24.


White 25 is the honte: if White played at 32, Black would extend at 25. White 32 also has the

drawback that Black can capture the two pivotal stones by attaching at 'a'.


Black 32 defends against White 'b', Black 32, White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e', etc.

Black 40. Seeking immediate life is best and is also consistent with Black's solid play with 32.


Black 48. An interesting counter to White 47.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Figure 2 (51 - 100)


Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Black 60 and 62 were the first moves criticised by Cho. For 60, Cho recommended playing at 'a', while he felt that 62 was too close to White's thickness.


White 65 makes the position difficult for Black, but White promptly lets him off the hook with an overplay at 69. The game would have been much tougher for Black if White had followed Dia. 2.

Black takes advantage of White's slip by giving atari at 70. His follow-up at 76 is a tesuji. Black could capture the corner group with 1 to 7 in Dia. 3, but White would be able to squeeze Black (beginning with an atari at 'a'), after which White 'b' would be severe. Moving out with the sequence to 88 in the figure is preferable.

Black 96 is a good move, extending Black's lib-



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

erties, but 98 lets slip a chance to clinch the game. Black should follow Dia. 4.

Dia. 4. If Black played 1 and 3, he would win the semeai. White has to give way with 4, so Black can play 5 to 9. White cannot hope to win the ko after 9, but if he connects at 7, Black plays 'a' and wins the semeai unconditionally.

Figure 3 (101 - 150)

Black 16 helps White's attack. Black should simply pull back at 1 in Dia. 5. White 2 is a tesuji, enabling White to capture two stones with 4 and 6, but Black could then switch to 7. Playing this way would simplify the position.

Black 44. Black should simply attach at 1 in Dia. 6. Black 3 makes miai of 'a' and 'b'.




Figure 3 (101 - 150)





Figure 4 (151 - 200)



Dia. 6

Dia. 7

Dia. 8

Dia. 9




Figure 5 (201 - 283)

62: connects: 81: ko; 83: connects

Figure 4 (151 - 200)

Black 60 is a good move, but 62 is an inadequate follow-up. Black should play 62 at 1 in Dia. 7, then cut at 3. If White 4, Black captures the three white stones with 5, so instead -

Dia. 8. White would have to play a ko with 1 to 6. Even though White takes the ko first, he has

much more at stake than Black.

Black 68 is a risky move. If White followed Dia. 9, squeezing in sente up to 7, then playing 9, Black would lose his two stones. If next Black 'a', White plays 'b'.


Figure 5 (201 - 283)

Black wins by $4\frac{1}{2}$ points.


('Igo Club', November 1981)

Good and Bad Style


Black to move




91




92



93




94




95


Bad style




Black 1 is inefficient: it secures a connection but that's about all.




If Black 1, White cuts at 2. Black must play 3 next, so he ends in gote and still has a weak point at 'a'.



Black 1, a 'raw peep', destroys all the aji of the position and also leaves the ▲ stone feeling lonely.




Black 1 to 5 are sente, but Black has a superior forcing sequence available here.




If Black 1, White hanes at 2. Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c' would probably follow. If Black answers 2 with a hane at 'b', White will cut.


Correct style




Black 1 is correct shape. Black can now aim at the hane at 'a' and at pushing through at 'b'.




The sequence to 8 is the joseki which leads to the problem position.




Black 1, a sacrifice, is the best way to settle the shape.




White can capture three stones, but Black gets sente and builds up a solid position.




Black should cut at 1, then press at 3 and squeeze. Next —




If White 8, Black plays 9 and 11, splitting White into two and isolating the $\triangle$ stone.




Black 1 is a cross between a peep and a placement. If White 'a', Black plays 'b', forcing White 'c', then switches elsewhere.



Connecting at 2 is the only move for White. Black then forces with 3 and 5 and can look forward to playing at 'a' later on.



Black 1 is the vital point of this shape. This forces White to grovel a bit in order to live.




White has to give atari at 4 and 6 before playing 8, so Black gets superb shape up to 11.


The Great Joseki Debate

Honda Kunihisa 9-dan


How to choose a joseki in relation to the board as a whole is the theme of this debate. In the lower left White has just answered Black's one-space jump with a knight's move. Three proposals are being made for Black's next move: which one fits the opening best?



Dia. A



Dia. B



Dia. C

A: In this position the left side is the most important area, so Black should block at 1. There's really nothing more to think about.


B: I disagree. Since Black has a solid position in the lower right corner, he should want to pincer White with 1. There's no hurry about playing on the left yet.

C: I think B's approach to the problem is wrong. As for A, I wonder if he knows about the attachment at 1? It should be kept in mind for situations like this.

Fuseki Analysis

Josekis work effectively in a certain direction. In order to choose one that is appropriate for a particular opening, it is necessary to examine the relation of the joseki to the neighboring positions along the sides or in the adjacent corners. The opposite corner is a matter for concern only when a ladder is involved. In this issue's opening (fuseki diagram, next page) Black must decide whether to emphasize the left side or the bottom before choosing his next move.


At the bottom Black's one-space jump in the lower right is low and solid, so this corner has



Fuseki Diagram

been played out. In addition, the lowness of the position means that Black cannot expect to develop much, while its solidity means that White will be reluctant to approach very close. The bottom, therefore, is an area where neither side is anxious to continue.

In the upper left a black stone on the five-three point opposes a white one on the three-four point. Because Black can press White down at 'a' at any time, the strength of the black stone works in the direction of the arrow and gives




Dia. 1


Black the advantage. Moreover, in the lower left White has just played the triangularly marked stone which attacks Black while seeking development up the side. The conclusion is that Black should choose a joseki that emphasizes the left side; the bottom is unimportant and can be treated lightly.

A Wins the Debate

The correct move for this opening is Black 1 in Dia. 1. Backed up by the circled black stone, it can be thought of as both an extension and a blocking move rather than as just a blocking move. Before continuing with the development of the fuseki, let's examine the joseki in isolation.




Dia. 2




Dia. 3

After White 3 in Dia. 2, Black has continuations at 'a', 'b', and 'c'. Black 'a' emphasizes the lower side and 'b' emphasizes the left. Black 'c' is a solid move which does not seem to be played very often. Black 1 in Dia. 3 is also seen, but it is not good because it entails a loss when White solidifies his position with 2.




Dia. 4



Dia. 5


When Black blocks at 1 in Dia. 4, White pushes at 2 since he cannot permit Black to take this point. Inducing White 2 allows Black to take the good point of 3, which affects the marked white stone. White now comes out at 4 since pushing at 1 in Dia. 5 only further damages the marked stone.

After White 4 in Dia. 4




Dia. 6

the joseki branches at 'a' and 'b' in Dia. 6. If Black pushes on the right, the joseki comes to a pause after White 6 and Black 7 in Dia. 7. Black is satisfied because the marked black stone hinders White's development up the left side, while on the lower side he has become thick. If he attaches instead of pushing, the sequence to Black 9 in Dia. 8 results (Black can also omit the Black 7–White 8 exchange). His purpose with the attachment is to settle his stones. Later, the marked black stone will be in a good position when he attacks the white group.




Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Of the two variations the one in Dia. 8 can be said to have more influence on the left, and is therefore better suited to this issue's fuseki. After Black 9 in Dia. 9 White will probably play 10, which allows Black to gain a firm foothold on the left with the extension to 11 or the knight's move at 'a'. If the White 12–Black 13 exchange is assumed, Black has solid territory in various places and a simple game.

If White replaces the diagonal move at 10 with




Dia. 9




Dia. 10

the pincer at 1 in Dia. 10, Black can keep things simple with the pressing move at 2 and still have an easy game after the sequence to 10. If he can play at 'a' later, he will be able to increase his territory while destroying White's base.


White is still in a difficult position if he answers Black's pressing move with 1 and 3 in Dia. 11. After he attaches at 5 and extends at 7, Black will cap at 9 when White connects at 8. Jumping out at 1 in Dia. 12 instead of connecting does not improve matters either, because Black will still be able to cap at 6 after cutting with 2 and 4.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12




Dia. 13

If White moves the pincer in Dia. 10 back one space to 1 in Dia. 13, Black will probably answer with the two-space jump at 2. After White 3 Black will attach at 4 and extend at 6; this combination is effective because the cut at 8 is severe (Black is happy to push out at 5 if White switches 5 to 7). If the sequence to 12, in which White becomes separated, is assumed, the fighting is bound to be advantageous for Black. In fact, Black's influence on the left is even greater than in the previous diagrams.


B's Proposal

B has proposed the pincer at 1 in Dia. 14. After White jumps out to 2, Black will cross under at 3. In this shape, too, Black must not push at 'a'. The continuation to the connection at 8 in Dia. 15 is a division of profit and influence. As should be expected from playing an additional move, White is extremely strong, so that approaching this position is very difficult.

After the joseki White can aim at 'a' in Dia.




Dia. 14




Dia. 15

16, although playing it immediately would be pointless, as Black answers at 'b'. When White plays 1, however, Black must answer around 2. The point at 1 and the area around 2 can thus be thought of as miai.




Dia. 16



Dia. 17

White sometimes omits 8 in Dia. 15, but after the White 1—Black 2 exchange in Dia. 17 he can no longer aim at the hane at 'b', since Black 'a' has become sente. Moreover, moves by Black around 'c' and 'd' are also sente, so White's thickness is considerably weaker than in Dia. 15.

Following B's suggestion leads to the result in Dia. 18. After Black 7 White will turn away from the corner to play the pincer at 8. After the Black 9—White 10 exchange Black can either settle himself with the joseki shown or play a counterpincer at 'a', but whichever way he plays it cannot be denied that White 8 is occupying an ideal point. White has a favourable game.




Dia. 18

C's Proposal


C's idea was the attachment at 1 in Dia. 19.

Its purpose is to strengthen Black before he plays the blocking move at 'a'. It is a solid way of playing, but, because it also strengthens White on the opposite side, it has disadvantages as well as advantages. The usual continuations are the connections at 'b' and 'c'; 'd', which forces Black 'e', is not good because it weakens the corner.




Dia. 19

If White plays the diagonal connection at 4 in Dia. 20, the sequence to White 12 is a joseki. White cannot omit the descent at 8 as an atari there by Black would be intolerable. After being sealed in by Black 9, White has to settle his group with 10 and 12. Although the diagonal connection is ideal for making eye shape, White dislikes having Black 7 become sente.




Dia. 20



Dia. 21

When White wants to avoid being shut in, he chooses the solid connection at 4 in Dia. 21, which is a fighting variation. After Black 7 White can move out toward the center with 8 and

(‘Gekkan Gogaku’, August 1981. Translated by David Thayer.)



Dia. 22


10; however, when Black turns at 11, White’s three stones at the bottom become a little heavy, in contrast to the earlier diagonal connection. It is not possible to say whether the variation in Dia. 20 or in Dia. 21 is better.

If C’s proposal is followed, then White will probably turn away from the bottom after Black 3 in Dia. 22 to play 4 on the left. Although cutting at 5 makes Black very thick locally, the pincer at 6 gives White the overall initiative. Black is dissatisfied because his thickness is facing the lower side. Had White followed the joseki in Dia. 20, then of course Black would be in a good position.


Answers to Tesuji Problems

Answer to Problem 1


Dia. 1. Black 1 is correct shape. This is a famous pattern, worth memorizing as it often comes up in actual play. The follow-up is important: if White hanes at 2, Black must give way at 3.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 2. If White connects at 1 next, Black is safe with 2. It follows that if White starts out with 1 here, omitting 1 in Dia. 1, Black must answer with 2 in this diagram.

Dia. 3. Cutting with 2 is greedy: Black loses his


four stones.

Dia. 4. Attempting to connect with 1 does not work. White cuts at 2 and either captures the four stones on the edge or separates Black with 4 and 6 here.


Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. Black 1 wins the fight unconditionally. If White 2, Black fills a liberty with 3.


Dia. 2. If White 4, Black connects at 5, and White cannot give atari on either side.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 3. The descent is often a tesuji in corner fights, but here it does not work. White attaches at 2, then sets up a ko with 4.


Dia. 4. Black 1 also lets White get a ko.

Answer to Problem 3


Dia. 1. White 1 forces Black to answer at 2. Black next throws in at 3, then —

Dia. 2. Gives atari with 5 and 7,


Dia. 3. Setting up a ladder with 9 etc.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Dia. 3




Dia. 1

Answer to Problem 4


Dia. 1. Black 1 and 3 are the lethal combination.




Dia. 2




Dia. 3




Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Dia. 2. White must play 4, but after Black 5 and 7 —

Dia. 3. White is helpless — if White 'a', Black 'b'.

Dia. 4. White might try blocking on the outside at 1. If Black makes the mistake of answering at 2, White can throw in at 3, forcing Black to resort to the ko at 'a'. However —

Dia. 5. If Black coolly answers at 2, nothing is changed.


Dia. 6. Black 3 here just invites White to live.

Dia. 7. If Black 1, White 2 is a smart way to live.


Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. Instead of connecting, Black must answer White's atari with a counter-atari. If White plays 2, Black can switch elsewhere, as White 'a' is not a threat.

Dia. 2. Connecting at 1 makes Black over-concentrated. White can now force with 2 and 4, building useful thickness. If Black omits 5 —




Dia. 1




Dia. 2


Dia. 3. White gets a snapback with 1 and 3.




Dia. 3




Dia. 1




Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Answer to Problem 6

Dia. 1. Black 1 is correct shape. If White 2, Black must play 3 — his stone here is a key stone, so he cannot sacrifice it.

Dia. 2. If White 4, Black prepares to squeeze with 5.

Dia. 3. After 7, Black 9 is a good follow-up. White must defend at 10, so Black can increase the pressure with 11. Whatever happens in the subsequent fight, Black should be able to handle it.


Dia. 4. Sacrificing the key cutting stone with 3 and 5 is not good enough. Black secures the corner territory with 5, but his approach is too negative.

Dia. 5. Black 1 to 5 here are out of the question.


Answer to Problem 7

Dia. 1. Black 1 looks unreasonable, but it is the tesuji. White has no choice but to answer at 2, as will be demonstrated, so next Black hanes at 3. Blocking at 4 is risky: Black cuts at 5, then if White 6 —


Dia. 2. Starts a ko with 7. This is unreasonable




Dia. 1




Dia. 2




Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6


for White, so instead of 4 —

Dia. 3. White has to compromise with 4 here. Black 5 is a clever continuation which forces White to connect at 6. Black thus makes a big reduction in White's corner up to 9. Later White will have to add another stone there.

Dia. 4. Fighting back with 2 is unreasonable. Black plays 3 to 7, then —

Dia. 5. Lives with 9 and 11.

Dia. 6. The ordinary sequence to 8 has little effect on White's corner.




Dia. 1

Answer to Problem 8


Dia. 1. Unlikely though it may seem, Black 1 is the first step towards securing life. White 2 is probable, whereupon Black connects at 3. Next —

Dia. 2. (next page). If White 4, Black plays 5, then —


Dia. 3. Black throws in at 7, creating a double atari: White cannot capture because of the snap-




Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

back, so he has to lose something. Black has very cleverly exploited his shortage of liberties.

Dia. 4. Beginning with the atari at 1 is a mistake. After Black 3 —

Dia. 5. White captures Black with 4 to 8. Timing is important with forcing moves such as 1 in Dia. 4.

Answer to Problem 9


Dia. 1. Black 1 is the tesuji. If White 2, Black continues with a two-step hane at 3.

Dia. 2. If White 4, Black must not extend at 5.


Dia. 3. Giving atari at 5 is the correct follow-up: White cannot connect.

Dia. 4. White must capture at 6, so White saves his stones with 7.


Dia. 5. If White answers 1 at 2, Black captures




Dia. 1




Dia. 2




Dia. 3




Dia. 4




Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

the key stones with 3.

Dia. 6. White 2 is no better.


Dia. 7. If White connects at 4, Black just connects at 5. He is one move ahead in the semeai.

Dia. 8. Pushing through with 1 is too slow. This way White wins by one move.


Test Your Rating

The following problems are designed to diagnose your real strength. Perhaps in this one article you can work your way right up the kyu ladder. Dan holders are warned to steer clear — they may not score 100%.


Test for 8-kyu



1. Black to play and kill White unconditionally.




2. Black to play and save his two stones on the left.




3. Black to play. What is the vital point for killing the white group?


Test for 5-kyu



1. The eight black stones at the top seem to be in trouble, but there is a way to save them.




A



B


2. Which is worth more — the connection in Dia. A or in Dia. B?




3. How many ko threats can Black get in the corner?

Test for 3-kyu


1. Can Black link up his three isolated stones?
2. White to play two moves in a row. Can he live with two free moves?
3. Black to play. What happens?



1




2




3


Test for 1-kyu



1. White can save his group at the top by capturing the marked black stones.



2. If it is White's turn to play, he can capture the black group. How many points would this be worth?




3. Black to play. Is there any way for him to save his captured group?

Solutions


8-kyu problems

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. The combination of the hane at 1 and the throw-in at 3 kills White. Black 1 works because it exploits White's shortage of liberties. If next White 'a' or 'b', Black plays 'c'.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


Dia. 2. Playing 1 first is wrong, as White gets a ko with 2 and 4.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. The throw-in at 1 is the key move. After Black 3 —



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. White cannot connect at 4.


In an actual game White would probably realize what was happening and cut his losses by playing 2 at 'a' in Dia. 1.

Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. Black 1 is a sharp move. If White 2, Black play 3 and White cannot play in at 'a'. If White plays 2 at 'b', Black plays 'a'.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. If White 1, Black takes the key point with 2 and secures a second eye. If Black 'a' next, White plays 'b'.


5-kyu problems

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. The eight black stones at the top only have two liberties, so there is no time to waste. Black starts with 1 and 3, then —



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Black keeps on giving atari with 5 and 7, after which the marked black stone proves to be in the right place.


Answer to Problem 2: B is bigger

Apart from the marked stone, Dias. A and B are identical. After White connects at 1 in Dia. A, his only follow-up is 'a', which has no effect on Black.



In Dia. B, White threatens to capture a stone next with 'b'. Alternatively, White could aim at peeping at 'c'. The move with the more follow-up moves is of course worth more.

Answer to Problem 3: 3 ko threats



Dia. 1. Black 1 is a mistake: Black only gets one ko threat.



Dia. 2. The placement at 1 is correct. White must answer at 2, so Black gets a second ko threat at 3, then —

Dia. 3. A third one at 5.

3-kyu problems

Answer to Problem 1



Dia. 1. Black 1 is the vital point.



Dia. 2. If Black 1, White can complicate matters with 2 and 4.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. White 1 and 3 are the only combination that secures life. The advantage of 3 is that —






Dia. 2. If Black takes away the eye on the edge with 4, White can capture with 5.

Answer to Problem 3: Black gets a ko.

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the only move that avoids unconditional death. However, White 2 is wrong, as it lets Black get a seki with 3. Instead —

Dia. 2. White 2 is the only move: Black is forced to play the ko.




Dia. 3. Black hopes for a chance to play 1 after capturing the ko.


1-kyu problems

Answer to Problem 1 (next page)

Dia. 1. White throws in at 1, then squeezes with 3 and 5. He then completes the capture with 7 etc.



Dia. 1 6:connects




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. White 1 lets Black off the hook. This time Black captures White in the sequence to 10. The vital point is 2.


Answer to Problem 2: 30 points

Dia. 1. White can capture Black with 1 — if Black 'a', White 'b'.

Dia. 2. Black can live by playing the marked stone. If he does so, the 1 — 2 exchange becomes his privilege.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

White 1 in Dia. 1 captures nine stones, worth eighteen points, and also takes seven extra points of territory (including the 'x' points). The total is twenty-five.

When Black plays the marked stone in Dia. 2, he secures five points of territory, so the difference between his living and dying adds up to thirty

points.


Answer to Problem 3: No

Dia. 1. Black cuts at White's solitary weak point with 1. White replies with 2 and 4.


Dia. 2. White captures three stones with 5 to 9, but then —

Dia. 3. He is promptly captured himself. This is a typical 'under the stones' (ishi no shita) tesuji.


If White plays 2 in Dia. 1 at 3, then Black is able to live.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

('Gekkan Gogaku', February 1977. Other articles in this series appeared in GW 7 and 9.)

6th Shinjin-O Title

O Rissei (Wang Li-ch'eng in Chinese), age 23, is the leading member of the strong contingent of young Taiwanese players active in Japanese go. He came to Japan in 1971 and first attracted attention in 1976, when he won the 3-dan section of the 1st Kisei tournament, then went on to defeat the 4-dan, 5-dan and 6-dan section winners. In 1978 he also won the 4-dan section. In 1981 he won his first title, the Shinjin-O (King of the New Stars), and did well in other tournaments, scoring 35 wins to 9 losses for the year. Along with Kataoka Satoshi and Kobayashi Satoru, he is one of the leading players of his generation.

O's opponent in the title match was Hasegawa Sunao 7-dan, then aged 21, of the Kansai Ki-in.




Figure 1 (1 – 44)




Figure 2 (45 – 83)

Although badly outplayed by O in this match, Hasegawa is a promising player who did very well in the 6th Kisei tournament.

6th Shinjin-O Title, Game One

White: Hasegawa Sunao 7-dan

Black: O Rissei 6-dan

Komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

9 July 1981. Played at the Kansai Ki-in.

Figure 1. White 14 is unusual: jumping to 20 is the most common joseki.

White 26. The losing move, according to Hasegawa. White should play White 38—Black 39—White 'a'—Black 40, then switch to White 38.

White falls a move behind here.

White 38, 40. The follow-up to White 26. Black's counter is 41. White takes profit on the side but at the cost of a weak, floating group in the centre.

Figure 2. White 54 is dubious: playing at 75 or 68 is preferable.

White 60. An all-or-nothing challenge — White has fallen way behind in territory. The continuation is forced.


White abruptly resigned after Black 83. If White played 'a' next, Black would answer at 'b' and a very difficult fight would follow, but Black would come out on top.

White resigns after Black 83.


Basic Fighting Techniques

Miyazawa Goro


The three problems below all involve the same elementary tesuji. Anyone of mid-kyu strength should be able to solve them, while dan-level players should get them on sight. If you have any trouble, then this article may be what you need to bring your technique up to scratch.



1. White to play (6-kyu)



2. Black to play (4-kyu)



3. Black to play (4-kyu)

Pattern Ten: The Pressing Move

The pressing move (kake) is a very useful tesuji for capturing enemy stones when more direct methods do not work. However, although it becomes easy to recognize the kind of position in which the pressing move is effective, a certain amount of reading is usually called for.






Illustration One: Black to play

Black can capture the single white stone regardless of whether or not the ladder is favourable.


Dia. 1. Black gives atari at 1. If White tries to escape with 2, he then presses at 3.



Dia. 1: the pressing move



Dia. 2: success




Dia. 3: White escapes


Dia. 2. White persists in trying to escape with 1. The 3–5 combination may look good, but Black keeps White in atari with 6, then finishes him off with 8. White cannot connect because of Black 'a'.

Dia. 3. Black 1 is hopeless: there is no stopping White after he extends at 2.


Problem One. To get out of trouble White has to capture the three black stones which are separating his groups.



Problem One: White to play



Dia. 1: too slow




Dia. 2: the vital point


Dia. 1. White 1 is too slow: Black easily gets away with 2 and 4. White is now faced with a very difficult fight. If White plays 1 at 'a', Black plays 1, capturing the white stones at the top.

Dia. 2. White has to make some attempt to surround Black, in which case White 1 is the only move.


Dia. 3. Black's strongest counter is to attach at 2. White 3 is the crucial follow-up tesuji for White. If Black 4 –




Dia. 3: resistance



Dia. 4



Dia. 5




Dia. 6: the wrong tesuji

Dia. 4. White cuts at 5, then —


Dia. 5. Captures with 7 and 9.

Dia. 6. The clamp (hasamitsuke) tesuji of 3 does not work in this case. Black simply connects at 4 and cannot be captured — if White 'a', Black 'b'.




Problem Two: Black to play


White has just extended at Δ , but this move is unreasonable. How can Black punish him for his recklessness?




Dia. 1: timid



Dia. 2: complete failure



Dia. 3: correct



Dia. 4

Dia. 1. Abandoning the three black stones with 1 is too timid. Black suffers a large loss and also loses sente.


Dia. 2. Black 1 offers no better prospect of success. The result to 5 is pitiful for Black. White can next attack Black's eye-base by descending at 'a'.

Dia. 3. Black 1, attacking at the corner of the white stones, is the tesuji.


Dia. 4. If White tries to escape, Black plays 3 and 5. The problem is what happens after White 6.

Dia. 5. Black drives White along the edge with 7 and 9, then captures him with 11 and 13. This tesuji is known as the 'loose ladder' (yurumi-shicho).


Dia. 6. Black 3 is wrong, of course. White escapes after 4; if Black 'a', White 'b'.



Dia. 5




Dia. 6




Problem 3: Black to play


Black wants to connect his group by capturing the three white stones.



Dia. 1: wrong follow-up



Dia. 2: White escapes




Dia. 3: attacking at a distance


Dia. 1 Black 1 is correct, but Black 3 is the wrong continuation.

Dia. 2. White has no trouble escaping with the sequence to 12.


Dia. 3. After 1, Black has to attack at a distance with the pressing move at 3.



Dia. 4: Black cuts



Dia. 5: snapback



Dia. 6: no escape

Dia. 4. If White 4 and 6, Black cuts at 7.

Dia. 5. If White 10, Black 11 gives a snapback.

Dia. 6. Trying to force his way out with 1 does not work for White. White 3 and 5 are countered by Black 6.


(‘Gekkan Go’, October 1978)

Aji-Keshi: Erasing Potential


Honda Kuniyoshi 9-dan

The problem of how best to exploit weaknesses in the opponent’s position is one of the most difficult aspects of go strategy. Played at the right time, a sente move may work perfectly to strengthen one’s own position; played at the wrong time it may well be of much more use to the opponent than it is to one’s own side. The very fact that a move is sente should be a signal to take a closer look at the position to see if one can make more subtle use of this advantage.


Dia. 1 shows one of the standard takamoku (5–4 point) josekis. White stakes out a high position with his final move at 7. In the past White ‘a’ was regarded as correct shape here. A third option is tenuki: White often leaves the three white stones on the side as they are and switches



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

elsewhere with 7.

Dia. 2. Later White can aim at making the strong follow-up move at 1.

Dia. 3. Black usually answers at 2.

It is difficult to know whether the exchange in Dias. 2 and 3 is a forcing move for White or whether it is aji-keshi. Locally, White 1 in Dia. 2



Dia. 4

Dia. 5

Dia. 6


is White's privilege; if Black answers at 2 in Dia. 3, White 1 has a strong claim to be considered a forcing move, but one can think of cases in which it becomes aji-keshi.

Before going into this, let's take a look at Black's other answers to White 1 in Dia. 2.

Dia. 4. Black can answer at 2, but that gives White another forcing move at 3, so generally Black is dissatisfied. However, if he omits 4 —

Dia. 5. White has a severe contact play at 1.

Dia. 6. If Black 2, White plays 3 and 5. Black 6 next is the strongest move. If the ladder on the outside is favourable, Black can capture the two white stones.



Dia. 7


Dia. 8

Dia. 9

Dia. 7. White plays 7 to 13. If he cannot get a ladder with 'a' or 'b' —

Dia. 8. Black can capture the three stones with 14. However, White squeezes in sente with 15 and builds central thickness, so this result is bad for Black. (Black cannot play 14 at 'a' because of White 'b')


Dia. 9. Black would probably have to compro-



Dia. 10

Dia. 11

Dia. 12



Dia. 13

Dia. 14

Dia. 15

mise with 2, but this result would also be distressing for Black. After Black 6, White can capture two stones with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'.

Dia. 10. If Black answers at 2, White can now aim at attaching at 3.

Dia. 11. If Black 4, White forces with 5 and 7.

Dia. 12. It seems preferable for Black to answer patiently with 4, a move which denies White any further forcing moves.


Dia. 13. Black could also counter by cutting with 2 and 4. His aim is to use Black 4 as a sacrifice to take sente. If White 5, he just defends at 6.

Dia. 14. White can capture the black stone with 7 and 9 (if Black 'a', White 'b'), but Black gets sente to play somewhere else.

The sequence in Dias. 13 and 14 enables Black to avoid making the submissive answer at 2 in Dia. 3, but it allows White to take considerable profit. Actually the sacrifice Black makes is too big unless there is a really compelling reason. The exchange in Dias. 2 and 3 is the basic pattern.

Dia. 15. In some positions White might prefer to play at 1. That is, he might want to leave himself with the option of playing this move, in which case White 1 in Dia. 2 would be aji-keshi. White 1 here aims at the invasion at 'a'.

Dia. 16. If White invades at 3, the continuation



Dia. 16

2: elsewhere

Dia. 17

Dia. 18

to 10 is one standard sequence.

Dia. 17. If Black defends against the invasion with 2, White then plays 3. If Black 4, White has succeeded in playing two forcing moves in succession, which would be somewhat painful for Black. Therefore —

Dia. 18. Black might prefer to defend against the invasion with 2, a more efficient move because it creates the threat of pressing at 'a'.

('Gekkan Gogaku', September 1977. Previous articles in this series appeared in GW7 and GW8.)

6th Meijin Title Match

The 1981 Meijin title match was an ideal card: Kato 'the killer' versus Cho Chikun, who is known for his tenacity in the infighting. Cho had been in better form during the year, but Kato still had two of his four titles and he had the momentum that comes from winning the Meijin league. It looked like being a close, hard-fought battle.

Kato's debut in the Meijin title was surprisingly long delayed, considering his success in other tournaments in the 1970's. Kato did not even get into the Meijin league until 1977, but the following year he tied for first place, though he lost a playoff to Otake. In 1980 he again tied for first, but this time lost the playoff to Cho Chikun. Both Otake and Cho went on to win the Meijin title, so in effect Kato provided their springboard to success. His luck turned the third time he tied for first place and he defeated Otake in the playoff in the 6th Meijin league.

Although past results are not always a good guide, Kato seems to have more trouble with Cho than just about any other player. His career record against him was a paltry six wins to fourteen losses prior to the start of this match and he had lost 0—3 in their only previous encounter in a title match (the 1975 Pro Best Ten final).

The highlight of the title match was the first game: it was one of the most violent and complicated fighting games of recent tournament history. The whole board turned into one enormous fight, with groups of stones being killed all over the place, but the final result was decided by 1½ points. It must be one of the most entertaining and exciting games we have presented in *Go World*.

Game One

White: Cho Chikun, Meijin & Honinbo

Black: Kato Masao, Tengen & Oza

Komi: 5½; time: 9 hours each

9, 10 September 1981

Played at Hanezawa Garden in Tokyo

Commentary by Cho Chikun

Figure (1 — 45). *Kato attacks early.*

Black 1, 3, 5. Kato's favourite pattern recently.

White 14. If at 'a', Black would probably ignore it and turn at 33.

Black 17. If Black plays 1 in Dia. 1, he gets better eye-shape, but 2 makes White strong, so this diagram is not necessarily better than 17.

Black 21. An unusually precipitate attack. At the time it seemed a good move. If instead Black plays 1 in Dia. 2, White can connect underneath with 2 to 6. Black 21 and 23 forestall that, but after the game Kato commented: 'Black 21 was not good. It loses the magari at 'b', which weakens





Figure 1 (1 — 45)

the black group on the left side.' The approach move at 'c' would be more usual.

White 26 is a probe. White 1 and 3 in Dia. 3 no



longer work.

White 30. White 'd' would also be a good point, but White does not want to let Black reinforce at 'e'.

White 32. The kosumi is a good move. If Black yields to the temptation to play 1 in Dia. 4, White captures his group with 2 and 4.

Black 33 looks a little strange, but if instead Black played at 1 in Dia. 5, White would immediately play 2 and 4, so Black would have to defend at 5 anyway.

Black 45. Going for profit with this move was apparently bad. Black should have extended at 1 in Dia. 6, inducing White 2 so that he can connect at 3. This way Black aims at attacking White on a large scale.

Figure 2 (46 – 83). *The threat of the ko*

Once White plays 46, the continuation is forced. Black takes some profit, but White 52 makes the white group thick.

Black 55—

White 60. This move is White's compensation for the profit Black took at the bottom; it subjects the centre black group to considerable pressure.

Black 61 leaves White with the option of playing a ko with 'a' after 62, but it is the strongest move. More solid would be playing Black 'b', White 64, Black 'c', but White would then switch to 74, so Black would fall behind in territory.

White 64. To prevent Black 'd', which would be very severe. Once White plays 64 he does not have to fear any damage to his own group from playing the ko at 'a'. The threat of this ko be-






Figure 2 (46 – 83)



comes one of the main themes of the game.


Black 69. If White cuts at 1 in Dia. 8, Black intends to fight with 2 and 4. His prospects would be good.

White 70. The sealed move. At this stage the game looks promising for White. Up to 76 he takes a large side territory.


Black 77 and 79 are correct style. Black 1 in Dia. 9 (next page) would be slack; White would be able to aim at cutting with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'.

White 80. What would happen if White started the ko at 'a'? See Dia. 10.

Dia. 10 (next page). The ko at 1 seems to be a



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

'hanami-ko' for White (i. e. one in which he has nothing to lose), but with 2 etc. Black has plenty of ko threats. He can then make the clamp at 8. If White goes all out to capture him, the result is that his own side territory gets quite bad aji.

Black 'a' in the figure, eliminating the ko aji, is in itself a dame move, so, considering that the game is proceeding well for him, White would be quite happy to see Black waste a move making the connection. There is no need for him to go out of his way to start the ko.

Figure 3 (84 – 110). *Kato attacks.*

Black 85 is the fighting move. The 'sensible' move would be Black 1 in Dia. 11, but that would let White take profit in sente with 2 to 6.

Black 89 was a mistake in direction. Cho expected Black 103, White 'a', Black 89, a sequence which would have stabilized Black's centre position. Kato probably intended to play at 103 after 89, but he did not get a chance, for Cho promptly peeped at 90. The continuation to 96 reversed the balance of power in the top centre.


Black 97 probes for weaknesses behind the enemy lines. White has to answer docilely at 98. He would like to play at 1 in Dia. 12, but he would be in trouble after Black 2 to 8.

Black 99, 101. This challenge looks slightly unreasonable, but Black is behind, so he has to do something. Extending at 1 in Dia. 13 with 101 would not be forceful enough.


Dia. 13. If Black 1, White would answer at 2; if next Black 3 and 5, White would give up his two stones at the top and attack in the centre with 10. Black's group would be lucky to survive.

Figure 4 (111 – 139). *A hard fight for Black*


Black 15. Black could capture White with 1 in



Dia. 11



Dia. 12



Dia. 13






Figure 3 (84 – 110)



Dia. 14



Dia. 15




Figure 4 (111 - 139)






Figure 5 (140 - 182)

54: connects



Dia. 16



Dia. 17

7: connects

Dia. 14, but White would settle his group with 2 to 6, which would make Black's attack with 99 in the previous figure meaningless.

White 18. White would like to play 1 in Dia. 15, but Black would then be able to kill the group at the top with 2 to 6.


Black 21. If at 1 in Dia. 16, White will force with 2, then play 4, attacking the centre black group below. Black 1 does not worry the white group at the top anyway, for White can play 'a', forcing Black 'b', then live in sente with 'c'. Black's first priority is to look after his centre group with 21. If he played 21 at 22, White would play 24 and aim at peeping at 'a', so the subsequent fighting would be very difficult. When Black plays 21, however, the sequence from 22 works very well for White.

Black 31. If Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 17, White captures at 4. Black cannot play 5 at 8 because of White 6, so he must capture at 5. White next forces with 6, then moves out with 8.

The sequence from 31 to 38 is inevitable, but



Dia. 18



Dia. 19


Black's next move is unexpected. Usually Black would save his six stones at the top, but the situation is too desperate for Black to play the usual move.

Figure 5 (140 - 182). Mistakes by Cho

White 48 is the only move. If White plays 1 etc. in Dia. 18, Black wins the capturing race after 10.

Black 57. If Black 70, White links up on the first line to the left of 41. However, Black 63 (threatening a serious ko with Black 69) would then become sente. Black's strategy with 57 is to attempt to make use of that threat.

White 58 is a bad mistake. The game would be over if White followed Dia. 19. The result is an approach-move ko for Black, but he has virtually



Dia. 20

no ko threats, so the black group is as good as dead.

Black 79. Black's invasion of the left side has been a success. To begin with, Black gains by reducing the corner territory, but there is an additional benefit.

Dia. 20. Black aims at playing 1 later on. White must play 2, so 'a' and 'b' become miai for Black to make a second eye.

White's mistake with 58 has permitted Black to make some gains, but White's lead has still not been upset. Black's large group is still unsettled and the problem of the ko at 'a' remains.

Figure 6 (183 – 215). *Cho starts the ko.*

White 98 is a mistake: White should simply capture at 'a', which would serve the same purpose of taking away Black's eye in the corner. Actually Black 97 was also wrong, since the correct sequence was Black 'b', White 'c', Black 97.

White 108. White decides that the time has come to start the ko.

White 114. Cho connected because he read out that he won the capturing race at the top, but he commented later that it would have been better to secure two eyes for his group by playing at 115. That would have given him extra ko threats at 'd' and 'e'.

Figure 7 (216 – 255). *An enormous semeai*

White 16 is a mistake. White should first hane at 21, then play 16 after Black 'a'. If next Black 19, White 20, Black 'b', White 25, Black 24, White 'c', Black 39, then White's capturing at 35 would be sente, so he would win the semeai (capturing race).




Figure 6 (183 – 215)

ko: 86, 89, 92, 112; 114: connects (at 109)





Figure 7 (216 – 255)

Black 25 is an excellent move, though it seems to be filling in Black's own liberties. If Black played elsewhere, at 27 for example, White 25 would turn the semeai into a ko.

White 26 is forced, because Black 26 would threaten to live with the ko.

White loses the semeai by one move, but he



Dia. 21

Dia. 22

took some compensation in advance with 214. The result of this fight in itself represents a gain for Black, but White later picks up a lot of black stragglers, so the game is very close.

White 32 is the last large point.

Black 33. Otake's opinion was that the low invasion at 1 in Dia. 21 would have been better. It is hard for White to find a good answer. If White 2, 3 and 5 are good for Black. If White plays 2 at 3, Black wedges in at 5.

Black 37. Rin and Ishida both commented that this was the losing move. They preferred Black 1 in Dia. 22. If the sequence to 9 followed, Black would indeed have a lead of a couple of points, but Sakata disagreed, since he felt that White would be able to exchange White 5 for Black 'a' before playing 4. Cho thought that Black 37 was correct.

Black 47 is a clever move which secures a connection with the sacrifice at 49.

Figure 8 (256 – 318). *A corpse-littered battlefield*

It seems hard to believe that a game with such an extraordinary number of captures could end up




Figure 8 (256 – 318)

62: throws in; 63: captures (above 61); 65: recaptures (below 64); 66: atari (two spaces below 64); 69: left of 57; 70: ko (at 64); 71: at 57; 72: captures six stones; 73: captures fifteen stones; 92: connects (right of 61); 116: connects (at 109)

being so close. It is a long time since tournament go has offered such a bloodthirsty spectacle. Occasionally large groups are captured, but it is very seldom that the whole board is littered with corpses like this. It is hard to know whether Cho's victory should be attributed to greater tenacity or just to luck, but professionals are agreed that this game will stand out in the history of the Meijin tournament.

White wins by 1½ points.

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Game Two

White: Kato Masao

Black: Cho Chikun

Played September 24–25, 1981, in Kyoto

Commentary by Cho Chikun




Figure 1 (1 – 38)


Figure 1 (1 – 38)

The opening of the second game is marked by the contrast between old and new Chinese-style fusekis, Black playing the high move at 5, White the low move at 6. The ensuing sequence up to 12 almost looks like imitation go.


Black is the first to enter the other's sphere of influence, coming in at 13. Instead, perhaps he could choose to start an enclosure race, by playing at 1 in Dia. 1. The continuation of 2 and 3 is probable, but at this point White's low Chinese fuseki somehow appears more stable. For instance, White can play 'a', Black 'b', then White 'c', threatening either to live in the corner or to jump to 'd'.

Cho: 'Black 17 makes correct shape. If White answers at 21, Black gets a good position by jumping to 19. He can also attach one space above White 6.'

White's reason for drawing back at 28 is that he wants to keep sente at all costs, so that Black doesn't get the chance to enclose the lower right corner. White does manage to keep sente to make the approach move at 38, but at the cost of leaving behind considerable bad aji, such as the placement at 'a' or the attachment at 'b'.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Kato suggested White 1 in Dia. 2 as an alternative to 28. If Black answers at 2, White can cut him off with 3 and attack the stones on the left.

Figure 2 (38 – 71)

Rather than attaching as Kato had in the upper left, Cho made the diagonal move at 39. Kato continued with the new moves at 40 and 42.

Cho: 'White 40 is a well thought-out move. Normally White would follow the sequence starting with the two-space jump, but the result of that would be to leave White looking rather thin. Since we started out with roughly identical positions, White does not want to end up with a thin shape when Black got such a thick position in the upper left with his extension at 37. This difference between "thick" and "thin" could actually affect the outcome of the game.'

In response to Black 43, White has no choice but to protect at 44. After this forcing move, Black goes around bolting the gates on his territory with 45 and 47.






Figure 2 (38 - 71)



Dia. 3




Dia. 4


Cho: 'Black 43 could be aji-keshi, so maybe it should wait a while. Also, instead of 47, Black 1 in Dia. 3 looks like a good point. When White comes into the corner, I could take sente with 3 through 7 and then attack at 9. But I just couldn't bring myself to play this in the game, since it means taking such a big initial loss.'

Black can't really expect to keep all the territory on the right side. White attaches at 48, and the real fighting begins.

Cho: 'I didn't have the confidence to play 49 at Black 1 in Dia. 4. After exchanging 2 for 3, White can either push up at 'a' or press down with 'b'. Playing 51 at 1 in Dia. 5 doesn't seem to work either, since after the sequence up to 8, 'a' and 'b' become miai. Maybe, though, instead of 55, Black 1 in Dia. 6 would have been better.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6


Black plays the tesuji of 7, and the diagonal connection at 11 works out beautifully.'

Kato finished off the first day by playing 56 as the sealed move.

Cho had not expected the connection at 56. Instead, he had been looking at the sequence White 58, Black 59, White 62. This would have allowed Black to continue with Black 63, White 64, Black 65, White 60, at which point the sequence of Black hane at 66, White 'a', Black 61 works nicely.

In the figure, Black extends at 57, but White's moves at 58 and 60 stop him cold in his tracks. The hane at 66 is not feasible, since the 62-63 exchange has not been made yet. If Black does try 66, White will connect at 61 and can then slide down to 'b' in response to Black 'a'.

Cho: 'Since White's sequence in the figure works so well, maybe what I really should have done is to play 57 at 1 in Dia. 7. But then White would just connect underneath with 8, and after Black's attachment at 9, either 'a' or 'b' would be a nice move for White.'



Dia. 7

After fifty-nine minutes of thought, Cho cut at 61, and the sequence progressed rapidly up to 68. White can claim victory in that he depressed Black's territory and ended up with orderly shape.

After another extended thinking bout, Cho attached at 69, setting the stage for the decisive fight of the game.




Figure 3 (71 - 123)

80: throws in; 81: takes; 83: connects

Figure 3 (71 - 123)


Although Kato spent two hours on 72-76, he later said that he should have pushed again at 85 rather than play 74.

Cho: 'For my part, attaching at 69 was bad timing. It just doesn't make go sense to leave baggage over on the left side and then come back to poke out at 75. I should have played 75 first.'


If White had played 74 at 85, the probable sequence is that Black jumps to 99, White blocks at 75, and Black extends to 74, but the outlook from that point on is extremely fuzzy.

When Cho cut at 77, Kato squeezed with 78 to 82, then extended at 84. Kato spent only four minutes on 84, but, judging by the result, it may well have been the losing move. Black's turn at 85 is worth its weight in gold. Kato said after the game that instead of 84, he should have sacrificed four stones with 1 to 3 in Dia. 8.

Cho: 'I thought something like Dia. 8 might happen. I was planning to protect at 6, to prevent



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

the sequence starting with White 108 in the figure.'

After thinking for the longest time in this game for him, Cho chopped through at 87.

Black 95 is the best move. Making the diagonal move at 98 would be risky.

White 96. If at 1 in Dia. 6, Black 2 now becomes a good move. If White 3, Black presses at 4, making a large capture.

With 98, White takes six stones and Black five, a trade of sorts. But on closer examination, one realizes that the area which White 'took' was already his to start with, whereas Black's capture is true profit. If this was a 'trade', Black certainly got the better end of it.

In any case, however White plays 96 and 98, the real damage is already done — the exchange of 85 for 90. Kato opens up a new battle front with 110, but the outcome has already been decided. Cho rushes into the endgame, sealing the bottom with 121 and 123.

Figure 4 (123 - 200)

Black 31. A nice move. If White carelessly extends up at 33, he is captured by a black hane underneath at 32.

Cho: 'Black 69 was bad. Since I had already played 67, I should have attached at 'a'.' The attachment at 'a' is a nice move anyway, but if Black plays it without 67 in place, White gets another chance with 2 through 8 in Dia. 10.





Figure 4 (123 - 200)



Dia. 10

Since Black plays 69, White presses him down with 70 and 72, reducing the difference on the board to under ten points.

Figure 5 (201 - 256)

The remaining moves do not affect the outcome. This game was quite a contrast to the




Figure 5 (201 - 256)

struggle in the first. Kato must have been disappointed with his performance.

Black wins by 3½ points.

(‘Kido’, November 1981. Translated by Robert Myers.)

Game Three

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Kato Masao

Played on 1, 2 October 1982 at Izu Nagaoka

Commentary by Cho Chikun

Figure 1 (1 - 46). *Kato muscles his way out.*

White 20: Cho did not extend at the top because he disliked letting Kato come out at 27: the sequence to 26 is an attempt to contain the black stone.

Black 27. Black tries to move out anyway, which is very severe. Cho commented that perhaps the more relaxed sequence of Black ‘a’—White ‘b’—Black ‘c’ was not part of Kato’s repertoire.

White 28—Black 41. White 28 seems to give White excellent shape, but it does not turn out as well as expected when Black is able to move out at 41. If White plays a second hane at 41 instead of 40, Black will cut at 40. After White ‘d’—Black ‘e’—White ‘f’—Black ‘g’, a melee develops.

Black 43. A good point.

White 44, White 46. Because of the cutting point at ‘h’, White decides to stop resisting. Playing 44 and 46 means that he is prepared to discard three stones.

Figure 2 (47 - 80) (next page). *White’s center stones are weakened.*

Black 47. Good order of moves as White is




Figure 1 (1 - 46)




Figure 2 (47 – 80)





Figure 3 (81 – 116)

prevented from squeezing.

White 52 – White 60. The sequence from 52 to 60 does not work well for White because his central thickness is cut loose. Much better for him is the sequence in Dia. 1 since he can aim at 'a' after jumping out to 5.



Dia. 1

Black 61. An alternative is enlarging the top with Black 71 – White 74 – Black 'a'.

White 62. Playing at the top is only natural when Black plays the kakari at 61.

White 64. White 'b' – Black 'c' – White 'd' is probably the normal development, but Cho lacked the confidence to play this way as the upper left is also big.

White 70 – White 72. When White sets about trying to make a position at the top, Black finally attacks with 71. Since Black's aim is to separate White, White first strengthens the top with 72.


Black 73 – White 74. Cho thought that Kato might attack on a large scale with Black 73 at 74. When he cut at 73 instead, Cho jumped to 74, aiming at cutting across at 'g' after White 'e' and Black 'f'.

White 76. Cho stakes the game on being able to save his center stones.

Figure 3 (81 – 116). The game seesaws.

Black 81. Kato said that he should have attacked with the sequence to 7 in Dia. 2. If Kato

had pushed through at 'a' with 1, Cho intended to follow the sequence White 'b' – Black 'c' – White 'd' – Black 'e' – White 7.




Dia. 2

White 82 – Black 83. White's prospects suddenly improve with 82, though during the game Cho still thought that he was not doing well. Black, however, needs a second move to complete the capture of the center white group. Despite 82, White must attack severely in the upper left because of the sente yose sequence Black 92 – White 91 – Black 'a', which makes precise calculation difficult.

Black 85, Black 87. Black 85 enlarges the center while Black 87 makes life at the top.


Black 89 – White 90. Black tries to protect against White 'b' – Black 'c' – White 'd' in sente before returning to the top to ensure life, but fighting spirit makes White resist by capturing with 90. If White had followed orders by answering at 1 in Dia. 3, Black would live with the sequence from 6 to 14. Cho disliked this result be-



Dia. 3

cause of the cutting aji left at 'a'. Kato later said that, instead of 6, he would have tried to seek life by attacking with Black 7—White 6—Black 'b'. This result is also unacceptable for White.

White 94. Cho also considered White 1 in Dia. 4, but rejected it because of the aji of the Black 2—Black 4 combination. White 1 at 'a' would have secured the capture of the upper left and made the game close (Kajiwara 9-dan thought it would have been enough). White 94 as played in the game allowed Black to counterattack at 95 and led to an exchange in which both 'dead' groups were able to escape to safety.



Dia. 4

Black 103, Black 105. Black escapes in sente. White's disadvantage becomes clear.

White 108. White 'e' seems bigger.

Black 113—White 114. It may be better to omit Black 113. White 114 is a bad move which eliminates the aji of White 'f'—Black 'g'—White 'h'.

Figure 4 (117 – 149). White aims at a ko.

Black 17. White has too little territory after this capture.

White 18, Black 21. White 18 bears down on Black's weaknesses in this area. Although Black 21 helps all his stones, it is a mistake. Black should instead strengthen his position with Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 5 to prevent White from starting a ko in





Figure 4 (117 – 149)

the upper left. If White plays 'a', Black will discard three stones and protect against the ko with Black 'b'. This would still keep him comfortably in the lead.



Dia. 5

White 22 – Black 27. White secures his center stones in sente. Despite 27, Black's territory is not as large as it appears because Black must defend at 'b' when White plays 'a'.

White 28. The move which White has been aiming at. The sequence which follows is inevitable and results in a ko.

White 46. White can ignore Black 45 because it does not threaten to kill the corner.

Figure 5 (150 – 200). An oversight by both sides

White 50 (next page). White 50 must be at 1 in Dia. 6 (next page) to ensure life. After Black 2 and White 3, the best that Black can do is a ko, but White is alive because Black has no ko threats. Other black moves give White life unconditionally: if Black switches 2 to 4, White connects and squeezes; if Black switches 4 to 7, White is alive after White 'a'—Black 10—White 4.




Figure 5 (150 - 200)






Figure 6 (201 - 243)



Dia. 6

Black 53. When White descends without making the placement in Dia. 6, Black can kill him with 1 in Dia. 7. Black 7 and 9 are excellent moves which do not leave White even a ko. Cho was not able to find this move during play, but he did notice it during the dinner recess. The fact that Kato had not noticed was a lucky break for Cho.



Dia. 7

12: connects

Figure 6 (201 - 243). Cho goes three up.

Kato needed a win in this game to get back in the series, and seemed to be on the way to his objective when Cho was able to reverse the lead with a ko. Kato was later given a chance to stage

a reversal of this own when Cho erred making life for a group, but he was unable to take advantage of the opportunity.

White wins by $3\frac{1}{2}$ points.

('Kido', November 1981. Translated by David Thayer)

Meijin Titleholders

Sponsorship: Yomiuri newspaper

- 1st (1962): Fujisawa Shuko 8-dan (won league with a 9-3 record)
- 2nd (1963): Sakata Eio 9-dan (defeated Shuko 4-3)
- 3rd (1964): Sakata (defeated Shuko 4-1)
- 4th (1965): Rin Kaiho 8-dan (defeated Sakata 4-2)
- 5th (1966): Rin (defeated Sakata 4-1)
- 6th (1967): Rin (defeated Sakata 4-1)
- 7th (1968): Takagawa Kaku 9-dan (defeated Rin 9-dan 4-1)
- 8th (1969): Rin (defeated Takagawa 4-2)
- 9th (1970): Shuko 9-dan (defeated Rin 4-2)
- 10th (1971): Rin (defeated Shuko 4-2)
- 11th (1972): Rin (defeated Shuko 4-2)
- 12th (1973): Rin (defeated Ishida Yoshio 7-dan 4-3)
- 13th (1974): Ishida 8-dan (defeated Rin 4-3)
- 14th (1975): Otake Hideo 9-dan (defeated Ishida 9-dan 4-3)

Sponsorship: Asahi newspaper

- 1st (1976): Otake (defeated Ishida 4-1)
- 2nd (1977): Rin (defeated Otake 4-0)
- 3rd (1978): Otake (defeated Rin 4-2)
- 4th (1979): Otake (defeated Ishida 4-1)
- 5th (1980): Cho Chikun 8-dan (defeated Otake 4-1)
- 6th (1981): Cho 9-dan (defeated Kato 9-dan 4-0)

Game Four

White: Kato Masao

Black: Cho Chikun

Played 14 – 15 October 1981 at Jozankei Spa near Sapporo in Hokkaido.

Commentary by Cho Chikun




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). *A peaceful fuseki*

The fuseki of this game features two 3–3 point invasions. This is one way of maintaining the territorial balance.

With 34. White again gives tit for tat. The invasions at 33 and 34 could be considered as miai.

Black 37 etc. Since White has strong positions above and below on the left side, settling the black group immediately is a good strategy. The hane at 45 defends against a placement at 'a'.

Figure 2 (51 – 84). *Black's thin position*

White 52. White continues to play solidly. He could also consider the invasion at 'a'; if Black 'b', White could move out with 'c', but then Black would be able to take the initiative and perhaps start a double attack with 'd' (or perhaps Black 52).

White 58, 60. Kato regretted this combination. Kato: 'Attacking with 1 and 3 in Dia. 1 would have been severer than White 58. If Black jumps to 4, White makes stylish shape, playing 5 in sente.' Despite Kato's reservations, Cho considered 58 and 60 to be quite a good attacking combination.

White 62. White could also simply connect against the peep. White 62 sets up the connection





Figure 2 (51 – 84)



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

played later with 98 and 100.


Black 73. The sealed move. This was a difficult stage of the game and Cho thought for sixty-five minutes. The main alternative he considered was pushing through and cutting with 1 and 3 in Dia. 2. Black's aim would be to stabilize his large group during the course of the centre fighting, but there would be a certain amount of risk in playing like this, considering that Black has weak groups at the top left and on the left side.

Black 75 is a good move. The existence of this follow-up was one reason why Cho opted for the straightforward move of 73.

Black 77, dodging White's attack with 76, is correct shape. Playing Black 'e' would just help White, who would continue with White 80, Black 'f', White 'g'. That would fix up White's shape and increase the effectiveness of White 52.

Black 79. Black has little choice. If he played at 1 in Dia. 3 (next page), White would have an excellent continuation with 2 to 6. If he played 1 at 3, White would cut at 1 and squeeze.

White 82 and 84 build thickness and glare menacingly at the three weak black groups.



Dia. 3

Dia. 4




Figure 3 (85 - 121)

Figure 3 (85 - 121). Cho's brilliancy

White 82 and 84 in the previous figure seemed to be good, solid moves, but ironically they provoked a brilliant counterpunch from Cho. Kato probably expected Cho to make a diagonal connection at 'a', since he was threatening to cut at 'b', but instead Cho responded with the innocuous-looking probe of 85.

Kato answered at 86 in order to keep the black group above open to attack. If he followed Dia. 4, Black would secure definite eye-shape for his group with the sequence to 8. That would in turn make White 82 and 84 in Figure 2 a little pointless.

Black 89 is a very useful cut. White has to answer at 90 because he is aiming at the combination of White 'c' and White 'b', but then, when Black pushes up with 91, he is forced to answer at 92 because of the threat of Black 'd'. Black 93 is also sente, so Black succeeds in defending his weak point at 'b' in sente, which is a very big gain for him. In contrast, White gains almost nothing


with his moves here.

Black 85 seems to have taken Kato completely by surprise. Kato: 'Instead of 82, perhaps I should have simply connected at the top with 98 and 100. That way I would still have had some prospect of attacking the black group at the top.'

Cho's response: 'That's how I expected Kato to play. Of course, when Black gets a stone at 99, the sequence Black 'e'—White 'f'—Black 'g' becomes possible. In other words, Black's worries about his centre group disappear. The black group at the top might come under heavy pressure, but it is hardly likely to die, so the game would be decided by what happened in the infertile area in the centre.'

In the game the tables were turned when Black played 95 in sente, for this stone proved useful in securing the group at the top.

Black 103. If Black tries to surround the centre with 1 in Dia. 5, White will be able to live in the corner with the sequence to 12. Black would have to let White live like this because he could not hope to win the ko with Black 5 at 7, followed by White 8, Black 9, White 12, Black atari, White 10.



Dia. 5

Dia. 6

Figure 4 (122 - 181). The final squall

Black 27. If Black blocks at 1 in Dia. 6, White will be able to break through his centre position, capturing some stones in the process, with 2 to 10.

Black 43. Cho went into byo-yomi.

Black 59 and 61 create eye potential, but Black should first give atari at 80. With the black group at the top still without definite eyes, White would be certain to answer at 'a'. Because of this slip, Black suffered some very anxious moments later on.

White 64, 66, 68. There is a truly frightening plan behind these moves. White reduces Black to a half eye (i.e., one in gote) on top with 72 and 74, then gives atari at 76. At this point Cho exclaimed at his own stupidity and rapped himself on the




Figure 4 (122 – 181)
34: ko (right of 27)






Figure 5 (182 – 239)
ko (at 93): 96, 99, 102, 105, 108, 111, 114;
116: connects



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

head with his fist.

Black 77. Black must not connect against the atari. If he does, White sets up a ko with 2 and 4 in Dia. 7. Cho had hallucinated that playing 3 at 4 would give a seki. Black barely managed to live up to 81 by giving up two stones, but Cho estimated his loss here as from three to five points, which would have been disastrous if the game had been a little closer.

Incidentally, note that it is too late for Black to make the atari at 80 once White has played 66, for that move makes it possible for White to play a ko, as in Dia. 8.

Dia. 8. If Black 1, White answers with 2, making miai of 'a' and 'b'. That means that if he wins the ko one of the black groups will die.

Figure 5 (182 – 239). Cho's second Meijin title
Black wins by $2\frac{1}{2}$ points.

In this game Kato changed his strategy from his aggressive approach in the first three games and instead concentrated on building thickness in the first part of the game, thus staking the game on being able to overhaul Cho in the latter part. This strategy half succeeded and at one stage in the middle game the position was extremely close and White might even have had the better prospects. But at the very instant that White tried to unleash his accumulated reserves of strength with 82 and 84 in Figure 2, he met with a stunning counterpunch with Black 85 to 89 in Figure 3. Cho's skill at generalship belies his years.

(*'Kido'*, December 1981)



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Page from Go History

Genjo and Chitoku (ii)

Genjo and Chitoku were two of the most evenly-matched rivals in go history. They played 77 games that survive (details given in the previous issue) and, making allowance for the fact that Chitoku held black in more games, their results were almost perfectly even. This is very unusual, for even when two rivals are closely matched in strength the fortunes of war ultimately favour one side and he takes a lead over his opponent. This is true of the greatest pair of rivals in this century, Go Seigen and Kitani — although their lifetime results were close to equal (it is an interesting coincidence that they also played 77 games), Go Seigen won the most important match they played, their jubango in 1939–41.

Perhaps because he was the younger, Chitoku started off on sen-ai-sen (black for two games out of three) when the two began playing each other, in 1788 (see GW25). In 1790 they played a jubango, which Chitoku, still on sen-ai-sen, won

5–4–1 jigo, and later that year he progressed to tagi-sen (even). He was briefly forced back to sen-ai-sen (for six games) and in 1797 he forced Genjo to sen-ai-sen for eight games, but otherwise their results were very even.

Genjo v. Chitoku (1794)

White: Nakano Chitoku

Black: Miyashige Genjo

Played at the Honinbo residence on 18 June 1794. Moves after 181 not recorded. Black wins by 2 points.

Commentary by Takemiya Masaki 9-dan

Figure 1 (1 – 34) (next page)

White 6. The high move is a feasible strategy as White 10 becomes a pincer.

Black 11 is too slow. The modern strategy would be to exchange Black 'a' for White 'b', then to invade at 'c'.

White 18 is a natural counterattack. White 1




Figure 1 (1 - 34)






Figure 2 (35 - 80)



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

in Dia. 1 would make good shape on the edge, but Black would use his sente to make a severe attack with 4 etc. at the bottom.


Black 31 is unusual. The standard joseki in this period was Black 1 in Dia. 2. Presumably Black did not want White to build central influence with the continuation to 10.

Figure 2 (35 - 80)

White 36. White would like to hane at 1 in



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 3, but Black would counter with 2 and 4. White can play 5, but Black links up with 6, then takes all the corner with 8.

Black 49 is necessary because of the threat of White 1 and 3 in Dia. 4. If Black connects at 4, White puts the whole group into ko, but giving up the two stones would be very painful. Black 'a' instead of 49 would also secure life but would have less effect on the centre.

White 52. Fighting spirit - White 'b' would give Black a good move at 'c'.

Black 55 is very severe, but White did not get a chance to reinforce here.

White 76. A subtle move which proves effective later on.




Figure 3 (81 - 131)




Figure 4 (132 – 181)




Figure 1 (1 – 60)

Figure 3 (81 – 131)

Black 89. If at 'a', White takes away his eyes with White 97, Black 89, White 'b', Black 96, White recaptures.

Black 99. If at 'c', White plays 'b'.

Figure 4 (132 – 181)

This was a game marked by fierce fighting right from the start. Black just barely managed to come through with a small lead.

Moves after 181 not recorded. Black wins by 2 points.

Genjo v. Chitoku (1794)

White: Miyashige Genjo

Black: Nakano Chitoku

24, 25 October 1894.

White resigns after 135 moves.

Commentary by Shimamura Toshihiro 9-dan




Figure 2 (61 – 135)
ko: 106

Figure 1 (1 – 60)

This game quickly moves into the familiar pattern between these two, with Genjo attacking and Chitoku going for territory and relying on his ability at shinogi (making eyes for groups in trouble). Chitoku's fondness for profit is evident in Black 41, a defiant answer to White's attack at the top.

Figure 2 (61 – 135)

White gives up trying to kill the black group on the top left and completes his moyo with 66 and 80. Black has to invade.

Black 91 is a superbly-judged move. White cannot hope to capture it, yet intercepting at 129

would not give him enough territory.

White 116 is surprising, but White has presumably calculated that simply capturing with 'a' does not give him enough points. White probably expected Black to reinforce at 'b' after the 119–120 exchange, in which case he could next play at 121 instead of 'a' (thanks to the presence of 116). That would make quite a difference to the endgame play on the edge.

Black 121. Black stakes the game on being able to survive White's attack. If White 'c' after Black 135, Black plays Black 'd' to White 'i', then gets a second eye with Black 'b'.

White resigns after Black 135.

GO AND CHEMISTRY: A DISCUSSION WITH RIN KAIHO AND FUKUI KENICHI

Fukui Kenichi of Kyoto University, who won the 1981 Nobel chemistry prize, is also an amateur go player. The following discussion between him and Rin Kaiho took place at the home of Fujita Goro, 6-dan (retired), who became a professional go player after majoring in geophysics at Kyoto University. (Slightly abridged from the January issue of *Kido*)

Fukui: As a go player, I'm far too weak even to discuss the game with Rin. I don't take the trouble to think when I play. My games are over in fifteen minutes.

Rin: I've heard that you use the computer in your research. What do you think of the computer and go?

Fukui: That's a question I had been wanting to ask a top-ranking go player myself. With a computer, if you write a program and give it a clear final goal, then no matter how complex the intervening calculations are, the machine will carry them out faithfully. Writing the program and choosing the goal are the key points. But with go, you start by choosing the goal: kill that group, for example, or sacrifice these stones to take something else. Then I guess you make up a program to reach the goal and do the calculations with the computer in your head, but the process is practically instantaneous.

Rin: If you play instantaneously, I would say you're playing by intuition.

Fukui: What is intuition? Perhaps, as some say, it's a burst of everything you've learned so far.

Rin: In go, I think it's a matter of accumulated experience. Your experience gives you a sense by which you can select moves without having to read each one out.

Fukui: It would be interesting to have a definition of what "intuition" and "sense" mean in an extremely logical game like go.

Rin: I don't know whether this will be of much help or not, but when the moves that intuition brings into your mind can't be backed up by reading, you usually get into trouble. Not always, but —

Fujita: And when you have time to think, you sometimes think dishonestly to make your intuition come out right.

Fukui: With us, the proverb "If you can't think straight, don't bother thinking" applies. Do professionals have the same experience?

Fujita: It's partly a matter of greed taking hold of you. There are amateurs who go into ecstasy when their opponent starts to think for a long time.

Rin: It's true that in actual play, long thinking is often followed by a bad move. While you're thinking, you become more and more ambitious. A player may actually be better off playing your type of fifteen-minute go. Professional players always search for the best move, but the best move remains a complete mystery.

Fukui: Can it be found? You might compare go with physics and chemistry. In a sense physics is very simple, because it deals with principles. In chemistry, to start with there are too many kinds of atoms, and the ways matter is put together are too complex, so it's very hard to treat the subject theoretically. Chemistry may be like go, in which it's hard to find the best move because the 19 x 19 board is too big. Would it be easy to find the best move if the board were reduced, say to about 13 x 13?

Rin: It would be impossible. Perhaps on a 9 x 9 board Black could always win.

Fukui: Modern computers are unbelievably advanced. They solve tens of thousands of equations in an instant. I have the feeling that if a computer were put to work on the 19 x 19 board, a certain degree of order might emerge. What do you think?

Rin: It's possible in theory.

Fujita: There are already sample life-and-death programs. As you say, a certain degree of order might emerge.

Fukui: But the order definitely wouldn't be elegant. Perhaps this is an area that no one should pursue.

Rin: Then let's change the subject. Could you tell me how you do your research?

Fukui: How I approach my work?

Rin: We go players play over other professionals' games and debate with each other.

Fukui: That's like reading other people's papers in the scientific literature and trying to go a little farther.

Rin: Do you do that type of studying by yourself?

Fukui: Yes, although after reaching a certain point, you can turn the work over to students or assistants and let them carry on.

Rin: Is doing research by yourself enjoyable, or is it a painful process?

Fukui: It's enjoyable. It's never painful. Even when you have the painful experience of not being able to solve a problem, it just makes the solution that much more enjoyable when you get it. As for working in isolation, I should think that professional go players have the harder time.

Fujita: True, because of the constant stress.

Fukui: Compared with which, the stress we suffer is nothing. We're free. We can break off whenever we like — do this much today and leave the rest for tomorrow. Perhaps that's why I become impatient when I play go. I don't care whether I win or lose; I just want to get finished quickly.

Rin: Have you experienced slumps in your research?

Fukui: No, I've just kept working and gradually made progress. Not always as fast as I've wanted to, but that's different from a slump.

Rin: Apparently you had confidence in yourself.

Fukui: Well, I've felt that I was doing creative work. On the other hand, when I look back on it, I question strongly whether the results came from my own abilities or from luck and chance.

Fujita: Could you explain the research for which you won the Nobel prize to Rin?

Rin: Please bear in mind that in chemistry, I take a thirteen-stone handicap.

Fukui: In simple terms, I gave chemistry the kind of logical quality that go has. It used to be said that you couldn't tell what would happen in a chemical reaction until you did the experiment. I made it possible to predict without doing experiments.

Rin: In go too, the ideal is to be able to read out the result without actually playing the move.

Fukui: Exactly. For me, the reading was math-

ematics. I used mathematical expressions to form a theory, did huge numerical calculations, and put logic into chemistry where previously the logic had been hidden by complexity. The calculations couldn't have been finished by a man in a lifetime, or several lifetimes, which is why I make daily use of a very big computer. You could say that the computer made my research possible.

Rin: A moment ago you questioned whether your results came from ability or luck. I assume you were being modest, but that remark left me with a strange feeling.

Fukui: It's not just the results of my work. I can't help feeling that chance and luck also had something to do with getting the Nobel prize.

Rin: Why?

Fukui: There are lots of people in Japan whose work deserves the Nobel prize, but, for example, in awarding the chemistry prize, there are many different fields: organic chemistry, inorganic chemistry, biochemistry, and so on. This year apparently they decided to choose from the field of theoretical chemistry, which is why my name came up. If they had decided to choose from a different field, I wouldn't have been considered.

Fujita: If outstanding research keeps occurring in a particular field, can't they keep on giving the prize in that field?

Fukui: No, because it's difficult to compare work in different fields. It would be like asking who is stronger: Rin or some shogi player. For that reason in their nominations they try to distribute the prizes around the different fields, like a player spreading his stones around the board in the fuseki.

Rin: I see.

Fukui: Timing is also a big question. I got the prize because I was there when it landed in the theoretical chemistry field. If I hadn't gotten it this year, I might never have gotten it. In go too, if you miss the timing — if you're even a little too early or late — the most brilliant move will turn out badly.

Rin: I never expected to find parallels between the Nobel prize nominations and the fuseki or timing in go.

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
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